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Climate Engineering Field Research: The 







As forecasts for climate change and its impacts have become more 
dire, climate engineering proposals have come under increasing 
consideration and are presently moving toward field trials. This article 
examines the relevant international environmental law, distinguishing 
between climate engineering research and deployment. It also emphasizes 
the climate change context of these proposals and the enabling function of 
law. Extant international environmental law generally favors such field 
tests, in large part because, even though field trials may present uncertain 
risks to humans and the environment, climate engineering may reduce the 
greater risks of climate change. Notably, this favorable legal setting is 
present in those multilateral environmental agreements whose subject 
matter is closest to climate engineering. This favorable legal setting is also, 
in part, due to several relevant multilateral environmental agreements that 
encourage scientific research and technological development, along with 
the fact that climate engineering research is consistent with principles of 
international environmental law. Existing international law, however, 
imposes some procedural duties on States who are responsible for climate 
engineering field research as well as a handful of particular prohibitions 
and constraints. 
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 Efforts thus far to reduce the risks from anthropogenic climate 
change have been disappointing. In response, some scientists are 
investigating intentional, large-scale interventions in global chemical, 
physical, and biological systems in order to reduce climate risks.1 These 
proposed “climate engineering” or “geoengineering” methods are 
controversial, in part, because some of them pose risks of their own to 
humans and the environment.2 International environmental law plays an 
important role in any discussion of climate engineering because some 
                                                                                                                           
 1. See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS (June 7, 2013) [hereinafter IPCC, PHYSICAL 
SCIENCE], available at http://www.climatechange2013.org/report/ (examining the potential 
of climate engineering as potential additional responses to climate change). 
 2. See id. at § TS.5.6 (discussing the risks associated with climate engineering and 
carbon dioxide reduction). 
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climate engineering techniques may cause trans-boundary damage or 
damage in areas beyond state jurisdiction.3 
 This article examines how existing international environmental law 
may regulate and influence field testing of climate engineering. In its 
examination, this article (1) distinguishes between climate engineering field 
research and deployment, focusing on the former due to its urgency; (2) 
considers climate engineering proposals in the context of climate change; 
and (3) emphasizes the enabling function of law.  
 Some multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) suggest that 
States seeking to protect the environment should balance the risks 
associated with climate engineering field tests with the reduction of climate 
change risks. Typically, this balance favors climate engineering field 
research. Although none of the MEAs address climate engineering directly, 
it is notable that those whose content is the closest to addressing climate 
engineering are among those that encourage its research. A second reason 
for this favorable legal setting is that many MEAs call upon States to 
engage in scientific research and technological development. Finally, 
climate engineering research is consistent with principles of international 
environmental law such as precaution, polluter pays, and common but 
differentiated responsibilities. Concurrently, existing laws impose a number 
of procedural duties, and they constrain or prohibit specific actions. 
 Part II of this article describes climate change and climate 
engineering along with some of the associated risks. Part III frames the 
discussion by considering several relevant legal topics. The subsequent 
three Parts examine binding MEAs, nonbinding MEAs, and customary 
international law, respectively. In the final Part, I conclude that the current 
international framework is favorable to future climate engineering research, 
although, there are a handful of unresolved issues. 
 
II. Climate Change and Climate Engineering 
 
 Climate change is among the greatest challenges facing society 
today.4 Humans are increasing the atmospheric concentrations of so-called 
greenhouse gases—especially carbon dioxide—which let light in but 
                                                                                                                           
 3. See id. (noting that in order for climate engineering methods to be effective, they 
need to be implemented on a large scale in order for the techniques to be effective). 
 4. See Ban Ki-moon, Sec’y-Gen., United Nations, Remarks at the Thirty-ninth 
Plenary Assembly of the World Federation of United Nations Associations (Aug. 10, 2009), 
available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/statments_full.a 
sp?statID=555 (“[Climate change] is, simply, the greatest collective challenge we face as a 
human family.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
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obstruct the escape of heat.5 Although most of these gases occur naturally, 
activities such as fossil fuel combustion and land use changes result in 
emission rates that are higher than their natural removal rate, leading to 
their accumulation in the Earth’s atmosphere.6 As the forecasts for climate 
change and its effects have become direr, a wider spectrum of responses has 
been considered. Initially, international responses focused on the abatement 
of greenhouse gas emissions.7 The leading vehicle for global cooperative 
abatement, the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, however, may not have actually reduced 
emissions.8 There are several additional reasons for pessimism looking 
forward. First, fossil fuel combustion is essential to economic activity, and 
its reduction carries large costs.9 Moreover, most current emissions are, and 
most future emissions will be, produced by developing countries that 
understandably insist on economic development and improvements in 
living conditions.10 Second, because the negative effects of greenhouse 
gases will occur decades after they are emitted and independently from 
their location, their abatement presents an enormous global and 
intergenerational collective action problem.11 In any international 
abatement agreement, each country is asked to undertake costly actions to 
prevent damage that will occur mostly in distant locations and in the 
future.12 Such steps are politically unpopular and it is tempting to free-ride 
                                                                                                                           
 5. See IPCC, PHYSICAL SCIENCE, supra note 1, § 1.2.2 (describing the effects created 
by certain gases and stating that “[h]umans enhance the greenhouse effect directly by 
emitting greenhouse gases”). 
 6. See id. § TS.3.2 (“Human activity leads to change in the atmosphere composition 
either directly (via emissions of gases or particles) or indirectly (via atmospheric 
chemistry).”). 
 7. See E. Lisa F. Schipper, Conceptual History of Adaptation in the UNFCCC 
Process, 15 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVTL. L. 82, 82–83 (describing the focus on 
emission reductions in early international climate negotiations). 
 8. See Quirin Schiermeier, Hot Air, 491 NATURE 656, 656 (2012) (stating that most 
Kyoto targets were met only due to economic downturns in Eastern Europe in the 1990s and 
worldwide in the late 2000s, and were more than offset by emission increases in countries 
without commitments under the Kyoto Protocol). 
 9. See WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, A QUESTION OF BALANCE: WEIGHING THE OPTIONS ON 
GLOBAL WARMING POLICIES 82 (2008) (estimating that both climate damage and emissions 
abatement costs are on the order of trillions to tens of trillions of dollars). 
 10. See INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2013 § 2 (Nov. 
12, 2013) (looking at global trends in energy usage through 2035). 
 11. See IPCC, PHYSICAL SCIENCE, supra note 1, § 12.5.2 (describing how the Earth’s 
surface temperatures lag behind changes in greenhouse gas concentrations). 
 12. See David G. Victor, On the Regulation of Geoengineering, 24 OXFORD REV. 
ECON. POL’Y 322, 324 (2008) (“With today’s technologies, achieving a deep cut in 
emissions will require costly investment for uncertain benefits that accrue mainly in the 
distant future—attributes that tend not to be rewarding for politicians.”); see also 
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or to defect from these agreements.13 Third, because excess carbon dioxide 
naturally leaves the atmosphere slowly, emission reductions would merely 
delay a given amount of climate change.14 Therefore, avoiding dangerous 
climate change requires radical changes in energy systems and net negative 
emissions.15 
 The second international response to the problem of climate change 
has been adaptation to the changing climate conditions.16 Adaptation was 
initially decried as “a kind of laziness, an arrogant faith in our ability to 
react in time to save our skin,” but is now considered another legitimate 
response.17 The capacity for adaptation is also limited.18 It is more urgent in 
                                                                                                                 
NORDHAUS, supra note 9, at 4–6 (describing the impact that climate change will have across 
the globe). 
 13. See Twelve Years of the Public’s Top Priorities, THE PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR 
THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.people-press.org/interactives/top-
priorities/ (demonstrating that the issue of global warning has been at or near the bottom of 
United States public policy priorities since its inclusion in 2007) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 14. See IPCC, PHYSICAL SCIENCE, supra note 1, § 12.5.2 (“[P]ast emissions commit us 
to persistent warming for hundreds of years . . . .”). 
 15. See Ken Caldeira, Climate Sensitivity Uncertainty and the Need for Energy 
Without CO2 Emission, 299 SCIENCE 2052, 2053 (2003) (“To achieve stabilization at a 2°C 
warming, we would need to install ~900 ± 500 [megawatts] of carbon emissions-free power 
generating capacity each day over the next 50 years. This is roughly the equivalent of a large 
carbon emissions-free power plant becoming functional somewhere in the world every 
day.”); IPCC, PHYSICAL SCIENCE, supra note 1, § SPM E.1, 12.3.1.3 (describing how the 
only Representative Concentration Pathway scenario considered by the IPCC under which 
global surface temperature change is likely remain below two degrees Celsius—an 
internationally agreed-upon target—through the end of the century is RCP2.6, which 
assumes net negative emissions). 
 16. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: 
IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, FINAL DRAFTS (ACCEPTED) § 14.1 (Oct. 28, 
2013) [hereinafter IPCC, IMPACTS], available at http://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/report/final-drafts/ 
(“Human and natural systems have a capacity to cope with adverse circumstances, but with 
continuing climate change, adaptation will be needed to maintain this capacity.”); 
Adaptation Overview, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/impacts-
adaptation/adapt-overview.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2014) (“‘Adaptation’ refers to efforts 
by society or ecosystems to prepare for or adjust to future climate change.”) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 17. See AL GORE, EARTH IN THE BALANCE: ECOLOGY AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT 240 
(1993) (“Believing that we can adapt to just about anything is ultimately a kind of laziness, 
an arrogant faith in our ability to react in time to save our skin.”); Schipper, supra note 7, at 
91 (“Since 2002, a complementary approach between adaptation and mitigation has gained 
support, with the acknowledgement that adaptation and mitigation are not 
alternatives . . . .”). 
 18. See IPCC, IMPACTS, supra note 16, § 16.4 (noting that, beyond a certain point, 
adaptive efforts fail to provide “an acceptable level of security from risks”). 
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developing countries, which are more vulnerable to climate change due to 
their geographies and economies.19 
 Industrialized countries are expected to finance adaption in poorer 
countries, as industrialized countries have historically dominated 
cumulative emissions.20 Climate adaptation, however, can be difficult to 
distinguish from traditional development projects.21 Industrialized countries 
can simply reclassify traditional development aid, and developing countries 
can simply reclassify traditional development projects as climate adaptation 
financing.22 Adaptation financing appears to be inadequate, although it is 
increasing.23 
 Climate engineering is presently emerging as a third potential set of 
responses to climate change.24 There are numerous proposed climate 
engineering methods which vary widely in their means, goals, speeds, costs, 
risks, capacities, and potential effectiveness.25 They are divided into two 
distinct categories. The first is carbon dioxide removal (CDR), increasingly 
called “negative emissions technologies,” in which intentional, large-scale 
                                                                                                                           
 19. See id. at § SPM (citing particular vulnerabilities in developing countries to 
flooding, economic losses from disasters, negative human health effects, displacement, and 
increased poverty). 
 20. See, e.g., United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 1, para. 
1, opened for signature May 9, 1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 171 
[hereinafter UNFCCC] (discussing the responsibilities of developed countries under the 
UNFCCC). 
 21. See IPCC, IMPACTS, supra note 16, § 14.5 (“[Experts] have found it difficult to 
clearly define and identify precisely what constitutes adaptation, how to track its 
implementation and effectiveness, and how to distinguish it from effective development.”). 
 22. See, e.g., BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FINANCE, HAVE DEVELOPED NATIONS BROKEN 
THEIR PROMISE ON $30BN ‘FAST-START’ FINANCE? (Victoria Cuming ed., 2011), available at 
http://about.bnef.com/white-papers/have-developed-nations-broken-their-promise-on-30bn-
fast-start-finance/ (observing that “only a small proportion of the promised funds [from 
developed countries] are ‘new and additional,’ with the rest diverted from other aid 
budgets”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). 
 23. See IPCC, IMPACTS, supra note 16, § 17 (“Global adaptation cost estimates are 
substantially greater than current adaptation funding and investment, particularly in 
developing countries, suggesting a funding gap and a growing adaptation deficit.”). 
 24. See Christopher W. Belter & Dian J. Seidel, A Bibliometric Analysis of Climate 
Engineering Research, 4 WILEY INTERDISC. REV. CLIMATE CHANGE 417, 417 (2013) (“The 
past five years have seen a dramatic increase in the number of media and scientific 
publications on the topic of climate engineering, or geoengineering, and some scientists are 
increasingly calling for more research on climate engineering as a possible supplement to 
climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies.”). 
 25. See generally JOHN SHEPHERD ET AL., THE ROYAL SOCIETY, GEOENGINEERING THE 
CLIMATE: SCIENCE, GOVERNANCE AND UNCERTAINTY (2009) (summarizing approaches to 
climate engineering); GEOENGINEERING RESPONSES TO CLIMATE CHANGE: SELECTED ENTRIES 
FROM THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SUSTAINABILITY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (Tim Lenton & 
Naomi Vaughan eds., 2013) (discussing various climate engineering methods). 
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interventions in earth systems would sequester the most important 
greenhouse gases.26 Speaking generally and relatively, while these less 
controversial and risky technologies would address climate change close to 
its cause, they would be slow and expensive.27 Indeed, most risks of CDR 
are local and of a character consistent with typical industrial activities, 
although the environmental impacts could be quite significant if CDR is 
scaled-up.28 A significant exception to these general CDR characteristics is 
ocean fertilization.29 This process would accelerate the natural biological 
carbon “pump,” in which marine phytoplankton indirectly incorporate 
atmospheric carbon dioxide into their bodies as they grow.30 The 
phytoplankton then sequester that carbon in the deeper ocean as they die 
and sink.31 Some scientists believe that adding a locally limiting nutrient 
(usually iron) to an area of the ocean would stimulate the growth of 
phytoplankton and lead to significant carbon sequestration.32 This method, 
however, poses risks to marine ecosystems.33 To date, over a dozen ocean 
fertilization field trials have produced mixed results.34 
                                                                                                                           
 26. See IPCC, PHYSICAL SCIENCE, supra note 1, Annex III (defining CDR as “a set of 
techniques that aim to remove CO2 directly from the atmosphere by either (1) increasing 
natural sinks for carbon or (2) using chemical engineering to remove the CO2, with the intent 
of reducing the atmospheric CO2 concentration”(emphasis original)). 
 27. See THE ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 21 (noting that CDR methods are 
technically possible and would have environmental impacts commensurate with their scale, 
carry high costs, and operate slowly). 
 28. See IPCC, PHYSICAL SCIENCE, supra note 1, § 6.5.1 (describing “direct air capture 
of CO2 using industrial methods”); id. (“[I]t is likely that CDR would have to be deployed at 
large-scale for at least one century to be able to significantly reduce atmospheric CO2.”). 
 29. See id. § 6.5.2.2 (noting that ocean fertilization seeks to increase the rate of 
transfer in the carbon cycle). 
 30. See THE ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 16 (“Carbon dioxide is fixed from 
surface waters by photosynthesisers—mostly, microscopic plants (algae). Some of the 
carbon they take up sinks below the surface waters in the form of organic matter . . . .”). 
 31. See id. at 17 (“The combined effect of photosynthesis in the surface followed by 
respiration deeper in the water column is to remove CO2 from the surface and re-release it at 
depth. This ‘biological pump’ exerts an important control on the CO2 concentration of 
surface water, which in turn strongly influences the concentration in the atmosphere.”). 
 32. See id. (“Methods [of fertilization] have been proposed to add otherwise limiting 
nutrients to the surface waters, and so promote algal growth, and enhance the biological 
pump.”). 
 33. See Phillip Williamson et al., Ocean Fertilization for Geoengineering: A Review of 
Effectiveness, Environmental Impacts and Emerging Governance, 90 PROCESS SAFETY AND 
ENVTL. PROT. 475, § 5 (2012) (“A range of unintended and mostly undesireable impacts of 
large-scale fertilization . . . include production of climate-relevant gases . . . ; effects on 
productivity; . . . and effects on seafloor ecosystem[s].”). 
 34. See SECRETARIAT OF THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, CONVENTION ON 
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, TECHNICAL SERIES NO. 45: SCIENTIFIC SYNTHESIS OF THE IMPACTS OF 
OCEAN FERTILIZATION ON MARINE BIODIVERSITY 52 tbl.1 (2009) (summarizing field trials). 
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 The other category of climate engineering is solar radiation 
management (SRM), which attempts to increase the portion of the incoming 
sunlight that is reflected, counterbalancing the warming component of 
climate change.35 In general, and relative to CDR, SRM would be fast and 
inexpensive, but would address only a symptom of climate change, create 
substantial risks, and is controversial.36 Three proposed methods stand out 
as potentially effective, but are potentially risky. First, under stratospheric 
aerosol injection (SAI), small particles would be introduced into the upper 
atmosphere, mimicking the cooling effect that is observed after large 
volcanic eruptions or—at lower atmospheric altitudes—in cities with air 
pollution.37 Under the second method, marine cloud brightening (MCB), 
ocean water would be sprayed into the air.38 The salt dust, which would 
remain after the droplets evaporate, would act as cloud condensation nuclei, 
in turn causing clouds to be more reflective.39 The third method would 
place objects, such as mirrors or dust, in space.40 These proposed SRM 
methods pose uncertain risks to the environment and humans. For example, 
SRM would unequally counteract the temperature and precipitation 
perturbations due to climate change.41 The result could be reduced 
precipitation in some areas.42 Furthermore, sunlight reaching the ground 
would be more diffuse while carbon dioxide concentrations remain 
elevated, increasing plant primary productivity and altering ecosystems.43 
The leading candidate for stratospheric injection, sulfur dioxide, may 
                                                                                                                           
 35. See IPCC, PHYSICAL SCIENCE, supra note 1, Annex III (defining SRM as “the 
intentional modification of the Earth’s shortwave radiative budget with the aim to reduce 
climate change according to a given metric” (emphasis original)). 
 36. See id. § 7.7 (discussing the consequences of SRM techniques). 
 37. See THE ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 29 (“Simulating the effect of large 
volcanic eruptions on global climate has been the subject of proposals for climate 
geoengineering for some time . . . . These proposals aim to artificially increase suphate 
aerosols in the stratosphere . . . thereby reducing the incoming solar radiation.”). 
 38. See id. at 27 (describing the process by which the salt from ocean water would be 
used to increase the number of cloud-condensation nuclei.). 
 39. See id. (“It is readily demonstrated that many small cloud micro droplets scatter 
and so reflect more of the incident light than a smaller quantity of larger droplets of the same 
total mass since the surface area of the small droplets is greater.”). 
 40. See id. at 32 (“Space-based methods propose to reduce the amount of solar energy 
reaching Earth by positioning sun-shields in space to reflect or deflect the solar radiation.”). 
 41. See Simone Tilmes et al., The Hydrological Impact of Geoengineering in the 
Geoengineering Model Intercomparison Project (GeoMIP), 118 J. GEOPHYSICAL RESEARCH: 
ATMOSPHERES 11036, 11053 (2013) (describing the uneven effects of SRM on temperature 
and precipitation). 
 42. See id. (“[T]he hydrological cycle would be perceptibly weakened by SRM . . . .”). 
 43. See J. Pongratz et al., Crop Yields in a Geoengineered Climate, 2 NATURE 
CLIMATIC CHANGE 101, 101 (2012) (“We find that in our models solar-radiation 
geoengineering in a high-CO2 climate generally causes crop yeields to increase, largely 
because temperature stresses are deiminshed . . . .”). 
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damage the ozone layer.44 Finally, if large-scale SRM were to stop 
suddenly, then climate change—most of which would have been suppressed 
by SRM—would accelerate, potentially causing more damage than if it had 
occurred over decades.45 SRM techniques, however, are attractive due to 
their ability to strongly and rapidly affect a large area at little cost.46 
Because of SRM’s attractiveness, risks, and potential low barriers to entry, 
world leaders would need to address decision-making, unilateralism, 
control, and conflict.47  
 There are some risks that would be prevalent in both climate 
engineering categories. For example, many commentators express concern 
that discussion of or research into climate engineering would reduce 
incentives and political willpower toward the preferred paths of emissions 
reductions and adaptation.48 Others cite the potential development of vested 
interests and technological momentum, which could influence future 
policy.49 
 Although most of the public and academic climate engineering 
discourse has focused on possible deployment, field research is more 
urgent.50 Logically—and hopefully—testing will occur before any 
deployment. Indeed, climate engineering research budgets are increasing 
and some projects now include field work.51 Early SRM field experiments 
                                                                                                                           
 44. See P. Heckendorn et al., The Impact of Geoengineering Aerosols on Stratospheric 
Temperature and Ozone, 4 ENVTL. RESEARCH LETTERS 1, 11 (2009) (linking proposed sulfur 
stratospheric aerosol injection with likely ozone depletion). 
 45. See IPCC, PHYSICAL SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 7-5 (“Additionally, scaling SRM to 
substantial levels would carry the risk that if the SRM were terminated for any reason, there 
is high confidence that surface temperatures would increase rapidly . . . which would stress 
systems sensitive to the rate of climate change.”).  
 46. See THE ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 34 (“It is likely that once a SRM 
method is implemented the climate system woud respond quite quickly with surface 
temperatures . . . .”). 
 47. See, e.g., David G. Victor, On the Regulation of Geoengineering, 24 OXFORD REV. 
ECON. POL’Y 322, 333 (2008) (“Growing attention to geoengineering will create pressure for 
regulation.”). 
 48. See Albert Lin, Does Geoengineering Present a Moral Hazard?, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
673, 674 (2013) (“Among the leading reasons for the geoengineering taboo was the worry 
that geoengineering endeavors would undermine mainstream efforts to combat climate 
change.”). 
 49. See, e.g., Dale Jamieson, Ethics and Intentional Climate Change, 33 CLIMATIC 
CHANGE 323, 333 (1996) (“[R]esearching a technology risks inappropriately developing 
it . . . . A research program often creates a community of researchers that functions as an 
interest group promoting the development of the technology that they are investigating.”). 
 50. See Jesse Reynolds, The Regulation of Climate Engineering, 3 L. INNOVATION & 
TECH. 113, 126 (2011) (arguing that climate change field research should generally be 
considered distinct from deployment and that regulation of the former is more urgent). 
 51. See, e.g., Research to Evaluate Climate Engineering: Risks, Challenges, and 
Opportunities?, DEUTSCHE FORSCHUNGSGEMEINSCHAFT (May 27, 2013, 16:39), 
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are examining natural, analogous phenomena and are also testing 
equipment.52 At some point in the progression of this research, scientists 
will desire to study the effectiveness and side effects of various SRM 
methods.53 It may be advantageous for scientists to begin SRM field tests 
relatively soon, because field tests with longer durations would require less 
forceful climatic interventions in order to detect a significant signal among 
the noise of weather.54 If the experiments are significant enough to alter the 
climate, then there is the potential for them to pose some associated risk.55 
Not all climate engineering field research, however, will pose 
environmental risks.56 This paper specifically addresses field tests of the 
riskier methods, such as ocean fertilization, SAI, and MCB, which are 
designed to sequester a significant amount of carbon or to alter a regional 
climate significantly. 
 
III. Legal Aspects 
 
 Before moving into this paper’s core, which examines existing 
international environmental law, several germane legal matters must be 
                                                                                                                 
http://www.spp-climate-engineering.de/news-single/items/287.html (announcing a new 
program from the German Science Foundation that aims “to reduce the large uncertainties in 
our current understanding of the impact of [climate engineering] on the planet”) (on file with 
the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT); Daniel 
Cressey, Cancelled Project Spurs Debate over Geoengineering Patents, 485 NATURE 429 
(2012) (describing a planned field test of stratospheric injection equipment). 
 52. See, e.g., Yu. A. Izrael et al., Field Studies of a Geo-engineering Method of 
Maintaining a Modern Climate with Aerosol Particles, 34 RUSSIAN METEOROLOGY & 
HYDROLOGY 635 (2009) (reporting the results of field experiments “studying the solar 
radiation transmission in the visible wavelength range with model aerosol media formed in 
the middle troposphere with the help of high-efficient standard aerosol generators aboard the 
helicopter”); Henry Fountain, Trial Balloon: A Tiny Geoengineering Experiment GREEN: 
ENERGY, THE ENV’T AND THE BOTTOM LINE (Jul. 17, 2012, 2:17 PM), 
http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/17/trial-balloon-a-tiny-geoengineering-experiment/ 
(reporting on plans for a possible field trial in the United States) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).  
 53. See David Keith et al., Research on Global Sun Block Needed Now, 463 NATURE 
426, 427 (2010) (arguing for field studies of SRM climate engineering). 
 54. See Douglas G. MacMynowski et al., Can We Test Geoengineering?, 4 ENERGY 
ENVTL. SCI. 5044, 5044 (2011) (quantifying “the trade-offs between duration and intensity of 
the test and it’s [sic] ability to make quantitative measurements of the climate’s response to 
SRM forcing”). 
 55. See Alan Robock et al., Studying Geoengineering with Natural and Anthropogenic 
Analogs, 121 CLIMATIC CHANGE 445, 446 (2013) (noting that “even small-scale experiments 
outside a laboratory environment could carry some risk”). 
 56. See Edward A. Parson & David W. Keith, End the Deadlock on Governance of 
Geoengineering Research, 339 SCIENCE 1278, 1279 (“[M]uch promising process research 
has trivial environmental impact, smaller than common commercial activities . . . .”). 
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briefly addressed. First, when a powerful new technology—particularly if it 
poses risks to humans and the environment—is proposed or introduced, it is 
important to determine the ways in which existing law prohibits, permits, or 
encourages its use.57 There are no MEAs and almost no international law, 
broadly defined, that directly address climate engineering.58 Several MEAs 
and aspects of customary international law, however, are important both in 
a narrow sense of their specific application, and more generally—and 
probably more importantly—when discussing the legal environment into 
which any climate engineering research or techniques would be 
introduced.59 Using a framework for regulation put forth by Roger 
Brownsword,60 I conclude that generally, extant law channels positively, in 
that it encourages climate engineering research, and that it has a positive 
regulatory tilt, in that gaps or ambiguities in the law will more often be 
resolved as permissive.61 It is in this sense that I assert that international 
environmental law is favorable to climate engineering research. 
 The second matter is that, throughout these discussions, there is 
often tension between the potential for climate engineering research to 
reduce climate risks to humans and the environment, and its own potential 
to cause harm.62 For shorthand, I refer to this as the “climate change/climate 
engineering tension.” Although balancing such potential benefits and risks 
is generally not a means of interpreting international law, in the case of 
climate engineering, it is the logical way to proceed.63 I argue below that 
existing international environmental law is best interpreted as being 
                                                                                                                           
 57. See  Roger Brownsword & Han Somsen, Law, Innovation and Technology: Before 
We Fast Forward, A Forum for Debate, 1 L. INNOVATION & TECH. 1 (2009) (describing the 
importance of the regulatory environment for a new technology). 
 58. See Karen N. Scott, International Law in the Anthropocene: Responding to the 
Geoengineering Challenge, 34 MICH. J. INT’L L. 309, 330 (2013) (“With the exception of 
reforestation and afforestation and ocean fertilization for scientific research purposes there 
are few legal instruments explicitly applicable to geoengineering.”). 
 59. See infra Parts IV–VI (discussing binding and nonbinding MEAs, as well as 
customary international law). 
 60. ROGER BROWNSWORD, RIGHTS, REGULATION, AND THE TECHNOLOGICAL 
REVOLUTION (2008). 
 61. See id. at 19–21 (presenting an analytical framework to examine regulations and 
describe their relationship with policy goals, wherein a regulatory “tilt” is a default position 
of regulators that can be interpreted despite ambiguities in existing regulation).  
 62. See Scott, supra note 58, at 313 (“[G]eoengineering creates a clear risk of serious 
harm to the transboundary and global environment; it utilizes common spaces such as the 
high seas, atmosphere, or outer space; and it has yet to be addressed . . . in any regulatory 
forum.”). 
 63. See id. at 330 (explaining the need to analyze international environmental law as it 
pertains to climate engineering using aggregate principles developed from various sources of 
law). 
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favorable toward climate engineering research.64 Even in the case of 
deployment, scientists’ current understanding is that the expected negative 
side effects of climate engineering would be much less severe than climate 
change alone.65 Given this understanding, carefully conducted field 
research—although it may present risks of its own to humans and the 
environment—would help us understand the extent to which climate 
engineering may be a beneficial option.66 Field research may be particularly 
valuable if climate change is more severe than expected, if damages from 
climate change are greater than expected, if we are unable to adapt society 
and the environment, or if future emissions reductions are significantly 
suboptimal.67 Furthermore, recall that “almost all justifications for 
international environmental protection are predominantly and in some sense 
anthropocentric.”68 The norms, rights, and obligations of international 
environmental law reveal that, for the most part, States are committed to the 
protection of humans and the environments that we value.69 Unsurprisingly, 
economic considerations are dominant, and even non-economic 
considerations, such as cultural and aesthetic benefits, are valued through a 
human perspective.70 
                                                                                                                           
 64. See infra Parts IV–VI (arguing that climate engineering research is permissible 
under current international environmental law). 
 65. See IPCC, PHYSICAL SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 7-5 (“Models consistently suggest 
that SRM would generally reduce climate differences compared to a world with elevated 
greenhouse gas concentrations and no SRM . . . .”); see also Juan B. Moreno-Cruz et al., A 
Simple Model to Account for Regional Inequalities in the Effectiveness of Solar Radiation 
Management, 110 CLIMATIC CHANGE 649, 649 (2012) (“We find that an SRM scheme 
optimized to restore population-weighted temperature changes to their baseline compensates 
for 99% of these changes while an SRM scheme . . . compensates for 97% of these changes. 
Hence, while inequalities in the effectiveness of SRM are important, they may not be as 
severe as . . . assumed.”). 
 66. See BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER’S TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE REMEDIATION, 
GEOENGINEERING: A NATIONAL STRATEGIC PLAN FOR RESEARCH ON THE POTENTIAL 
EFFECTIVENESS, FEASIBILITY, AND CONSEQUENCES OF CLIMATE REMEDIATION TECHNOLOGIES 
3 (2011) (advocating for climate engineering research “to be able to judge whether particular 
climate remediation techniques could offer a meaningful response to the risks of climate 
change”).  
 67. See generally Juan B. Moreno-Cruz & David W. Keith, Climate Policy Under 
Uncertainty: A Case for Solar Geoengineering, 121 CLIMATIC CHANGE 431 (2012) 
(modeling the benefits of climate engineering research based on the uncertain amount of 
climate change for a given increase in greenhouse gas concentrations). 
 68. PATRICIA W. BIRNIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 7 (2009). 
 69. See id. at 7–8 (discussing the anthropocentric orientation of international 
environmental law). 
 70. See Scott, supra note 58, at 357 (“The integration of human and nature that 
characterizes the Anthropocene has implicitly been recognized by the application of the core 
principles of international environmental law to all activities likely to have a significant 
impact on the environment . . . .”). 
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 This climate change/climate engineering tension is particularly 
relevant because greenhouse gases and climate change often meet the 
definitions of “pollution” or “adverse effects,” which the MEAs examined 
below seek to reduce.71 Whether greenhouse gases, which harm humans 
and the environment only indirectly, should be considered to be pollution is 
not immediately obvious, and has been examined surprisingly little. Several 
authors have concluded that greenhouse gases do indeed meet the criteria 
for “pollution of the marine environment”72 under the UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),73 and nearly identical definitions are used 
in the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP 
Convention)74 and the Convention for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR).75 Furthermore, there is 
an emerging discourse as to whether States may be responsible and 
potentially liable for greenhouse gas emissions.76 At the domestic level, 
                                                                                                                           
 71. See UNFCCC, supra note 20, art. 1, para. 1 (“‘Adverse effects of climate change’ 
means changes in the physical environment or biota resulting from climate change which 
have significant deleterious effects on the composition, resilience or productivity of natural 
and managed ecosystems or on the operation of socio-economic systems or on human health 
and welfare.”). 
 72. See, e.g., Richard S. J. Tol & Roda Verheyen, State Responsibility and 
Compensation for Climate Change Damages—A Legal and Economic Assessment, 32 
ENERGY POL’Y 1109, 1117 (2004) (concluding that greenhouse gases meet the UNCLOS 
definition of pollution of the marine environment); Meinhard Doelle, Climate Change and 
the Use of the Dispute Settlement Regime of the Law of the Sea Convention, 37 OCEAN DEV. 
INT’L L. 319, 322 (2006) (“[I]t would seem that human-induced GHG emissions fit within 
the definition of marine pollution in UNCLOS . . . .”).   
 73. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 1.1.4, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter UNCLOS] (“[P]ollution of the marine environment means the 
introduction by man . . . of substances or energy into the marine environment . . . which 
results or is likely to result in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine 
life, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities . . . .”). 
 74. Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution art. 1, Nov. 13, 1979, 
1302 U.N.T.S. 219 [hereinafter LRTAP Convention] (“Air pollution means the 
introduction . . . of substances or energy into the air resulting in deleterious effects of such a 
nature as to endanger human health, harm living resources and ecosystems . . . and impair or 
interfere with amenities and other legitimate uses of the environment . . . .”); see also 
PHILIPPE SANDS & JACQUELINE PEEL, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
247 (3d ed. 2012) (“The definition of ‘air pollution’ is broad enough to include atmospheric 
emissions of greenhouse gases and ozone-depleting substances as ‘air pollutants’ . . . . ”). 
 75. Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East 
Atlantic, art. 1(d), Sept. 22, 1992, 2354 U.N.T.S. 67 [hereinafter OSPAR Convention] 
(“‘Pollution’ means the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substatnces or energy 
into the maritime area which results, or is likely to result, in hazards to human health, harm 
to living resources and marine ecosystems, damage to amenities or interference with other 
legitimate uses of the sea.”). 
 76. See CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY 9 (Michael Faure & Marjan Peeters eds., 2011) 
(addressing “the question to what extent actions taken, mostly by public authorities, based 
on the precautionary principle could specifically lead to liability”); see generally CLIMATE 
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whether greenhouse gases are “air pollutants” under the Clean Air Act 
(CAA) was central to a U.S. Supreme Court case, which ruled that the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has the authority to regulate 
greenhouse gases.77 Vague terms in various MEAs may also raise the 
climate change/climate engineering tension. Specifically, climate change 
may satisfy the mostly undefined terms such as “damage” or “adverse 
effects” found in the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone 
Layer,78 the Antarctic Treaty System’s Madrid Protocol,79 and the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).80 Similarly, commitments to 
protect the environment often imply that States should consider innovative 
actions such as climate engineering in order to do so.81 
 The third matter is that the legal implications for research are 
different from those of deployment. Scientific research is encouraged by 
                                                                                                                 
CHANGE LIABILITY: TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE (Richard Lord et al. eds., 2011) 
(discussing liability for state action or inaction as it pertains to addressing the effects of 
climate change). 
 77. See Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 534 (2007) (concluding 
that under the Clean Air Act, the EPA has the power to regulate carbon emissions from 
motor vehicles as air pollutant agents that contribute to climate change). 
 78. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, art. 1.2, opened for 
signature Mar. 22, 1985, 1513 U.N.T.S. 293 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (“‘Adverse 
effects’ means changes in the physical environment or biota, including changes in climate, 
which have significant deleterious effects on human health or on the composition, resilience 
and productivity of natural land managed ecosystems, or on materials useful to mankind.”). 
 79. Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, art. 3.2, Oct. 4, 
1991, 30 I.L.M. 1461 [hereinafter Madrid Protocol] (prohibiting “activities that result in 
adverse effects on climate or weather patterns, significant adverse effects on air or water 
quality, significant changes in the atmospheric, terrestrial (including aquatic), glacial or 
marine environments, and further jeopardy to endangered or threatened species or 
populations of such species”). 
 80. Convention on Biological Diversity, arts. 7(c), 8, opened for signature June 5, 
1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79 [hereinafter CBD] (“Each contracting party shall identify processes 
and categories of activities which have or are likely to have significant adverse impacts on 
the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, and monitor their effects 
through sampling and other techniques.”). 
 81. See Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of 
Environmental Modification Techniques, art. III.2, Dec. 10, 1976, 1108 U.N.T.S. 151 
[hereinafter ENMOD] (“The State parties to this Convention undertake to facilitate, and 
have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological 
information on the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes.”); 
see also Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, para. 7, 
June 16, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 1416 [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration] (“Man has the 
fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of 
a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he bears a solemn responsibility to 
protect and improve the environment for present and future generations.”). 
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numerous multilateral agreements, environmental and non-environmental.82 
These regulations are dominated by guidelines and other forms of soft law, 
frequently developed by expert, non-state bodies.83 Some scholars assert 
that there is a right to conduct research, although even this would be limited 
by risks to others and the environment.84 Some treaties, such as those 
concerning potential weapons of mass destruction, do not directly address 
research but implicate it in their implementation.85 Research is referenced 
only in passing in other agreements, such as the International Convention 
for the Regulation of Whaling,86 but has become a central issue in the 
implementation of these treaties.87 Among the MEAs examined here, only 
UNCLOS and the Madrid Protocol contain detailed provisions governing 
scientific research.88 
 In the case of climate engineering, the differences between research 
and its deployment are due to the smaller scale of research, the lower state 
of knowledge present during research, the generation of knowledge, and 
                                                                                                                           
 82. See infra text accompanying notes 125–126 (UNFCCC), 170, 176 (Vienna 
Convention), 146–147 (ENMOD), 183 (LRTAP Convention), 198 (Oslo Protocol), 210 
(Outer Space Treaty), 241–244 (UNCLOS), 293,–300 (Antarctica Treaty), 318 (OSPAR 
Convention), 367 (Stockholm Declaration), 374 (Rio Declaration). 
 83. See, e.g., Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects, 
WORLD MED. ASS’N, http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/b3/ (last visited Mar. 
22, 2014) (providing ethical guidelines for medical practitioners and researchers when using 
human subjects in research and testing) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF 
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 84. See Arjun Appadurai, The Right to Research, 4 GLOBAL SOC. EDUC. 167, 168 
(2006) (arguing that there is a universal and fundamental right for all humans to research and 
gather knowledge); see also Mark Brown & David Guston, Science, Democracy, and the 
Right to Research, 15 SCI. ENG. ETHICS 351, 359 (2009) (“Non-scientists are also more 
likely to accept the notion of a right to do research if it is explicitly coupled with an 
acknowledgement that the preservation of this right depends on scientists fulfilling its 
corresponding obligations.”). 
 85. See, e.g., Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, 
Apr. 10, 1972, 26, U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163 (outlining the policies and procedures 
necessary for any country wishing to develop, produce, or stockpile weapons of mass 
destruction). 
 86. See International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, art. VIII, Dec. 2, 
1946, 161 U.N.T.S. 72 (“[A]ny contracting government may grant to any of its nationals a 
special permit authorizing that national to kill, take and treat whales for purposes of 
scientific research subject to such restrictions as to number and subject to such other 
conditions as the Contracting Government thinks fit.”).  
 87. See, e.g., id. (regulating whaling). 
 88. See UNCLOS, supra note 73, art. 87, ¶¶ 238–65 (establishing the freedom to 
conduct scientific research in the high seas so long as the interests of other States are 
considered before research begins); Antarctic Treaty, pmbl, art. I-III, IX, Dec. 1, 1959, 204 
U.N.T.S. 71 (establishing the use of Antarctica for, inter alia, scientific purposes). 
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(possibly) the intent.89 Regarding scale, field tests will generally be 
designed to impact a smaller region at a lesser intensity for a shorter 
duration than full deployment, and any resulting damage to humans or the 
environment should likewise be lesser, perhaps not meeting the threshold 
for the applicable law.90 With respect to the state of knowledge during 
research, the risks posed by field tests may remain uncertain at the time 
they are carried out.91 The then-current state of knowledge will 
consequently be germane to whether a given test would be considered 
likely to harm humans or the environment. Furthermore, the tests are 
intended to generate knowledge through scientific research, which is 
encouraged by some of the MEAs discussed below. Finally, although the 
intent of scientists could potentially help distinguish between field research 
and deployment, it will be of little significance because international 
environmental law is rarely concerned with intent.92 
 As an extension of the research-deployment distinction, the 
category of “risky climate engineering field research” will not always be 
discrete in two dimensions of comparison. “Vertically” it may be difficult 
to distinguish those tests that pose no real risk from those which do, as well 
as distinguishing large-scale field research from actual deployment.93 
                                                                                                                           
 89. See generally David R. Morrow et al., Toward Ethical Norms and Institutions for 
Climate Engineering Research, 4 ENVTL. RESEARCH LETTERS 045106 (2009) (distinguishing 
climate engineering research from climate engineering deployment based on environmental 
impacts, timeline, and “the intentions of those carring out the [climate engineering] activity” 
). 
 90. See Parson & Keith, supra note 56, at 1279 (discussing the limited scale of 
research). 
 91. See MacMynowski et al., supra note 54, at 5044 (estimating the intensity of SRM 
required in a large-scale field test and the possible resulting changes in precipitation). 
 92. See Morrow, et. al., supra note 89, at 045106 (“Thus, the difference between CE 
research and CE practice lies in the intentions of those carrying out the CE activity.”). At 
least in the case of CDR, there may be a distinction between research and deployment based 
on whether there is an intent to gain financial benefit. Indeed, the nascent international 
regulatory framework for ocean fertilization requires that “legitimate scientific research” 
have no direct financial benefits for the researcher. See infra Part IV.H (describing the LC-
LP’s prohibition against ocean dumping and its exception for “legitimate scientific 
research”). Similarly, a recent field experiment explicitly examined marine cloud formation 
and climate in general, but had clear implications for MCB SRM. See generally Lynn M. 
Russell et al., Eastern Pacific Emitted Aerosol Cloud Experiment, 94 BULL. AM. 
METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y 709 (2013) (describing aerosol effects on warm-cloud 
microphysics). 
 93. See Alan Robock et al., A Test for Geoengineering?, 327 SCIENCE 530, 530 (2012) 
(“We argue that geoengineering cannot be tested without full-scale implementation.”); but 
see MacMynowski et al, supra note 54, at 5045 (“[O]ur results demonstrate that useful 
knowledge can be obtained without full-scale implementation.”). 
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“Laterally,” it may be difficult to distinguish outdoor research from similar 
topics that resemble—but are not—climate engineering.94 
 The fourth legal matter is the function of law. Regulation in general 
can be called “the sustained and focused attempt to alter the behavior of 
others according to defined standards or purposes with the intention of 
producing a broadly defined outcome or outcomes.”95 Thus, regulation can 
both encourage and discourage certain actions.96 Indeed, law has 
enablement and facilitation among its functions, and has obligations, 
incentives, and exhortations among its tools.97 Yet, regulation is too often 
framed as being only restrictive.98 
 Fifth, it is with respect to these previous three aspects—the climate 
change/climate engineering tension, the differences between research and 
deployment, and the enabling function of law—that the existing legal 
literature concerning climate engineering, although enlightening, remains 
limited. A number of scholars have reviewed how international law may 
restrict a State’s deployment of climate engineering.99 These scholars 
                                                                                                                           
 94. See Morrow, et. al., supra note 89, at 045106 (“[T]he technologies developed or 
made possible through . . . research may be deployed in ways intended to cause harm. We 
can foresee some of these ways, but not all.”). For example, a “rogue” researcher claimed 
that his ocean fertilization was to increase the stock of salmon, which feed on phytoplankton. 
This may have allowed him to comply with the letter, but not the spirit, of international law. 
See Neil Craik et al., Regulating Geoengineering Research through Domestic Environmental 
Protection Frameworks: Reflections on the Recent Canadian Ocean Fertilization Case, 
CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 117, 117–18 (2013) (“The principals involved in the activity 
characterized it as an ocean ‘restoration’ project . . . . However, they also made public 
statements indicating that they planned to generate revenue.”).  
 95. Julia Black, Decentering Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and 
Self Regulation in a “Post-Regulatory” World, 54 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 103, 142 
(2001). 
 96. See ANTHONY OGUS, REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC THEORY 1 (1994) 
(“[T]he state seeks to encourage or direct behaviour which it is assumed would not occur 
without such intervention.”). 
 97. See id. (addressing how regulation can cause parties to act in certain ways). 
 98. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1398 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “regulation” as 
the “act or process of controlling by rule or restriction”). 
 99. See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, May We Engineer the Climate?, 33 CLIMATIC CHANGE 
309, 310 (1996) (analyzing the legal restrictions on climate engineering); see also Ralph 
Bodle, Geoengineering and International Law: The Search for Common Legal Ground, 46 
TULSA L. REV. 305, 308 (2010) (reviewing sources of international law that effect the 
permissibility of climate engineering); Rex J. Zedalis, Climate Change and the National 
Academy of Sciences’ Idea of Geoengineering: One American Academic’s Perspective on 
First Considering the Text of Existing International Agreements, 19 EUR. ENERGY ENVTL. L. 
REV. 18, 20 (2010) (critiquing the nature of international agreements and the attitude toward 
climate engineering); Catherine Redgwell, Geoengineering the Climate: Technological 
Solutions to Mitigation-Failure or Continuing Carbon Addiction?, 5 CARBON & CLIMATE L. 
REV. 178, 181–88 (2011) (describing the limitations imposed by the current legal regime); 
Gerd Winter, Climate Engineering and International Law: Last Resort or the End of 
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generally overlook the more urgent topic of field research, the fact that 
international law enables field research, and that the purpose of climate 
engineering would be to reduce climate change risks.100 
 Sixth, not all risks are alike. Specifically, those risks discussed 
above can be conceptualized on a rough spectrum from environmental to 
social in character. Changes to precipitation due to SRM and ecological 
impacts from ocean fertilization are, for the most part, environmental 
risks.101 Technological momentum and a “slippery slope” from research to 
deployment are relatively social risks.102 International environmental law 
could be an effective set of tools for reducing the former group.103 On the 
other hand, the management of the more social risks will call for a broader 
set of innovative legal and non-legal means in international, transnational, 
and national settings, possibly including international environmental law 
but likely relying more heavily on a plurality of diverse means.104 
 As a final note, it must be remembered that international law is not 
implemented solely through literal readings of treaty texts. Instead, it is 
self-enforced and enforced internationally through political channels among 
countries of unequal power, reputation, and interests.105 An act by a 
                                                                                                                 
Humanity?, 20 REV. EUR. COMM. & INT’L ENVTL. L. 277, 279 (2011) (explaining the effects 
of law on climate engineering activity); David A. Wirth, Engineering the Climate: 
Geoengineering as a Challenge to International Governance, 40 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 
413, 421–24 (2013) (describing the limits imposed by the current legal framework on 
climate engineering proposals); Scott, supra note 58 (reviewing possible contradictions in 
international law presented by climate engineering). 
 100. See, e.g., Winter, supra note 99, at 288 (concluding normatively that “large-scale 
research of SRM must be prohibited from the outset”). 
 101. See Press Release, European Geosciences Union, Geoengineering Could Disrupt 
Rainfall Patterns (June 6, 2012), available at http://www.egu.eu/news/4/geoengineering-
could-disrupt-rainfall-patterns/ (“Under the scenario studied, rainfall strongly decreases . . . . 
Overall, global rainfall is reduced by about five percent on average in all four models 
studied.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). 
 102. See SOLAR RADIATION MANAGEMENT GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE, SOLAR RADIATION 
MANAGEMENT: THE GOVERNANCE OF RESEARCH 21 (2011), available at 
http://www.srmgi.org/report/ (“Even very basic . . . research into SRM could be a first step 
onto a ‘slippery slope’ towards deployment. Research could create momentum for 
development of SRM technology, as well as . . . lobbying . . . [which] could use its influence 
to override moral and other objections or to unduly influence public opinion.”) (on file with 
the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 103. See id. at 35 (describing international environmental instruments and institutions 
as a method of governance). 
 104. See, e.g., id. at 35–37 (listing additional forms of governance, including “a 
collection of independent national policies” and “a non-governmental, transnational code of 
conduct”). 
 105. See Richard H. Steinberg, Wanted: Dead or Alive—Realist Approaches To 
International Law, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 146, 150 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. 
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responsible member of the international community, which technically is 
contrary to an MEA but which other members view favorably, is unlikely to 
be condemned.106 Likewise, a willful act by a so-called rogue state which 
violates no international law, but may have negative impacts on other 
countries, will be condemned.107 Although this article uses a rather literal 
reading, this is intended as a starting point and will not necessarily perfectly 
reflect reality. 
 
IV. Binding Multilateral Environmental Agreements 
 
Binding MEAs constitute the most important source of international 
environmental law. This section reviews those MEAs that will likely have 
the most impact on climate engineering field research. For the sake of 
brevity and focus, this review is limited in three ways: to agreements 
concerned with environmental protection (even though other domains such 
as human rights may be relevant); to those agreements that are pertinent to 
climate engineering research; and to global agreements or MEAs that cover 
a large geographical areas. Although no MEAs directly address climate 
engineering, their objectives, commitments, and hortatory statements both 
reflect and influence state behavior, illuminating the norms of the 
international community.108 This review will require an exercise in treaty 
interpretation.109 Of course, MEAs are not merely isolated collections of 
                                                                                                                 
Pollack eds., 2013) (arguing that “international law reflects the interests of powerful states” 
and that “if an international law contradicts the long-term interests of a powerful state, then 
it will not comply with it”). 
 106. See, e.g., INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL KOSOVO COMMISSION, THE KOSOVO 
REPORT 186 (2000) (“The Commission concludes that the NATO military intervention was 
illegal but legitimate.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 107. See Anthony C. Arend, International Law and Rogue States: The Failure of the 
Charter Framework, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 735, 735–36 (discussing the ramifications of a 
rogue State’s actions that do not violate international law but are still disapproved of by the 
international community); Daniel H. Joyner, Iran's Nuclear Program and International Law, 
2 PENN. ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 237 (2013) (arguing that Iran’s nuclear program complies with 
international law, despite condemnation by Western countries and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency). 
 108. See David G. Victor, Enforcing International Environmental Law: Implications 
for an Effective Global Warming Regime, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 147, 151 (Fall 
1999) (“More than 140 multilateral environmental agreements govern behavior related to 
dozens of international environmental issues. . . . [D]espite the rarity of enforcement 
mechanisms, generally countries have complied with their international environmental 
commitments.”). 
 109. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 31–33, opened for signature 
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (providing that a treaty is to be interpreted in good faith, 
within its legal context, and in a manner consistent with its objectives; that words are to be 
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words. Although intergovernmental and national institutions that operate in 
a complex political reality implement them, this paper emphasizes the 
actual texts of these documents. 
 
A. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
 
 The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is 
the most important document in international environmental law regarding 
climate engineering because of its subject matter, its global participation, 
and its robust institutional support.110 Its objective is not merely to prevent 
dangerous climate change, but to do so in a manner that is balanced with 
other anthropocentric and environmental desiderata: 
 
The ultimate objective . . . is . . . stabilization of greenhouse 
gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a 
time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally 
to climate change, to ensure that food production is not 
threatened and to enable economic development to proceed 
in a sustainable manner.111 
 
Likewise, the key phrase “adverse effects of climate change” encompasses 
harm both to the environment and “the operation of socio-economic 
systems or . . . human health and welfare.”112 Similarly, the UNFCCC’s 
first principle indicates that a chief reason to minimize climate change is 
anthropocentric: “The Parties should protect the climate system for the 
benefit of present and future generations of humankind.”113 This MEA does 
not limit states’ actions in meeting its objectives to its commitments, 
implying that states may do so by other means.114 
                                                                                                                 
understood in their ordinary meaning; and that ambiguities may be clarified through 
preparatory documents and “the circumstances of its conclusion”). 
 110. See Lakshman Guruswamy, Energy Justice and Sustainable Development, 21 
COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 231, 233–34 n.5 (2010) (discussing the wide acceptance of 
the UNFCCC based on its ratification by 194 States). 
 111. UNFCCC, supra note 20, art. 2. 
 112. Id. art. 1.1. 
 113. Id. art. 3.1. 
 114. See id. art. 4.2(a) (“Each of these Parties shall adopt national policies and take 
corresponding measures . . . . These Parties may implement such policies and measures 
jointly with other Parties and may assist other Parties in contributing to the achievement of 
the objective of the Convention . . . .”). 
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 At a minimum, the UNFCCC supports research into CDR, 
including ocean fertilization. In its text, Parties commit to stabilize 
greenhouse gases through both the reduction of emissions and the 
enhancement of sinks and reservoirs, which is defined to include oceans 
and the biological pump.115 Three separate commitments obligate Parties to 
mitigate the adverse effects of climate change through such sinks and 
reservoirs.116 Two of these commitments include the enhancement of sinks 
and reservoirs, and one explicitly refers to oceans: “All 
Parties . . . shall . . . promote and cooperate in the conservation and 
enhancement, as appropriate, of sinks and reservoirs of all greenhouses 
gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, including . . . oceans as well 
as other . . . marine ecosystems.”117 These goals are furthered by the 
agreement’s Kyoto Protocol, which, although focused on emission 
reduction, commits Parties to further the Protocol’s objectives by 
researching and promoting “carbon dioxide sequestration technologies 
and . . . advanced and innovative environmentally sound technologies.”118 
 The UNFCCC is less clear with respect to the development of 
SRM, which would not further the agreement’s objective of stabilizing 
greenhouse gas concentrations.119 Two general conclusions of scientific 
research must be highlighted before examining specific provisions. First, 
humans will soon be, or perhaps already are, committed to a magnitude of 
future climate change that is “dangerous” because it will threaten 
                                                                                                                           
 115. See id. arts. 1.7, 1.8, 4.1, 4.2. (defining a reservoir as “a component or components 
of the climate system where a greenhouse gas or a precursor of a greenhouse gas is stored” 
and a sink as “any process, activity or mechanism which removes a greenhouse gas, an 
aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas from the atmosphere”). 
 116. See id. arts. 4.1(b), 4.1(d), 4.2(a) (setting out the different obligations of parties to 
mitigate adverse climate change). 
 117. Id. arts. 4.1(d), 4.2(a). 
 118. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148, art. 2.1(a)(iv); see also id. art. 10(c) (requiring Parties to 
“[c]ooperate in the promotion of effective modalities for the development, application and 
diffusion of, and take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, 
the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies, know-how, practices and 
processes pertinent to climate change, in particular to developing countries, including the 
formulation of policies and programmes for the effective transfer of environmentally sound 
technologies that are publicly owned or in the public domain and the creation of an enabling 
environment for the private sector, to promote and enhance the transfer of, and access to, 
environmentally sound technologies”). 
 119. See UNFCCC, supra note 20, art. 2 (“The ultimate objective of this 
Convention . . . is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, 
stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”); THE ROYAL 
SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 24 (“While SRM methods might therefore help to mitigate 
against a rise in global mean surface temperature, they do nothing directly to reduce 
atmospheric concentrations of CO2, or the rate at which they are increasing.”). 
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ecosystems, food production, and sustainable economic development.120 
Second, current models indicate that potential SAI or MCB deployment 
would be rapid and relatively inexpensive.121  
 Several passages in the UNFCCC indicate a relatively favorable 
position regarding SRM research. As quoted above, the UNFCCC’s 
objective calls for some urgency, given the expected onset of significant 
climate change.122 Furthermore, another principle of the UNFCCC states 
that “[t]he Parties should . . . tak[e] into account that policies and measures 
to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global 
benefits at the lowest possible cost.”123 Similarly, a more strongly-worded 
commitment states that Parties “shall . . . employ appropriate 
methods . . . with a view to minimizing adverse effects on the economy, on 
public health and on the quality of the environment, of projects or measures 
undertaken by them to mitigate or adapt to climate change.”124 From these 
provisions, SRM could be understood to be a form of adaptation, albeit an 
extreme one. Finally, multiple passages call for the development and 
diffusion of technology and research, further implying a positive stance 
toward climate engineering research.125 For example: 
 
All Parties . . . shall . . . Promote and cooperate in 
scientific, technological, technical, socio-economic and 
other research . . . intended to further the understanding and 
to reduce or eliminate the remaining uncertainties 
regarding . . . the economic and social consequences of 
various response strategies; [and] Promote and cooperate in 
the full, open and prompt exchange of relevant scientific, 
technological, [and] technical . . . information related 
                                                                                                                           
 120. See Morrow et al., supra note 89, at 045106 (“With regard to the moral hazard, 
unless scientists take great care in what experiments they do, what they publish, and how 
they explain their work, the public and policy makers may develop an optimistic bias . . . . If 
this happens, hope for a technological fix for climate change may cripple efforts to limit 
greenhouse gas emissions.”). 
 121. See THE ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 24–33 (noting the low estimated costs 
of several SRM techniques). Estimates for the financial cost of SRM to counterbalance the 
warming effect of a doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide range from approximately $1 
billion to $100 billion per year. See generally Gernot Klepper & Wilfried Rickels, The Real 
Economics of Climate Engineering, ECON. RESEARCH INT’L 316564 (2012) (discussing the 
financial costs of climate engineering).  
 122. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (stating the objectives of the 
UNFCCC). 
 123. UNFCCC, supra note 20, art. 3.3. 
 124. Id. art. 4.1(f). 
 125. See id. arts. 4.3, 4.7, 4.8, 4.9, and 11.1 (requiring Parties to develop and diffuse 
new technologies and to engage in research). 
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to . . . the economic and social consequences of various 
response strategies.126 
 
 The UNFCCC invokes two applicable principles of international 
environmental law, both of which point favorably to climate engineering 
research. First, efforts to minimize climate change must be done according 
to common but differentiated responsibilities.127 Climate engineering 
research is consistent with this, as exclusively industrialized countries 
presently fund it, which is likely to continue for the foreseeable future.128 
Meanwhile all countries, especially the less developed ones, which are on 
average more vulnerable to climate change, could benefit from the 
increased knowledge of possible alternative responses to climate change.129 
Second, the UNFCCC invokes the precautionary principle: 
 
                                                                                                                           
 126. Id. art. 4.1(g) and (h); see also arts. 5, 9.2 (stating that the phrase “response 
strategies” is undefined but presumably could include responses other than those encouraged 
by the UNFCCC). 
 127. See id. pmbl. ¶ 6, art. 3.1, 4.1 (discussing action needed to minimize climate 
change). 
 128. See Andrew Parker & David Keith, Public Research Funds Committed To 
Geoengineering Research Projects (Oct. 31, 2012), 
http://environment.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/srm_projects_around_the_world.pdf 
(indicating that climate engineering research projects are publicly-funded in Austria, 
Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Norway, and the United Kingdom) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 129. See UNFCCC, supra note 20, pmbl. (recognizing that developing countries “are 
particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change”). This assumes open 
publications of results and minimal intellectual property claims, which appear to be 
emerging norms, especially for SRM. See generally Michael MacCracken et al., THE 
ASILOMAR CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATIONS ON PRINCIPLES FOR RESEARCH INTO CLIMATE 
ENGINEERING TECHNIQUES (2010), available at 
http://www.climate.org/PDF/AsilomarConferenceReport.pdf (calling for open and 
cooperative climate engineering research) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL 
OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT); BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER’S TASK FORCE 
ON CLIMATE REMEDIATION, GEOENGINEERING: A NATIONAL STRATEGIC PLAN FOR RESEARCH 
ON THE POTENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS, FEASIBILITY, AND CONSEQUENCES OF CLIMATE 
REMEDIATION TECHNOLOGIES (2011), available at 
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/library/report/task-force-climate-remediation-research 
(advocating open and interdisciplinary research efforts) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND 
LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT); Steve Rayner et al., The 
Oxford Principles, 121 CLIMATIC CHANGE 499 (2013) (proposing norms for climate 
engineering and its research, including open publication of results and minimal patents on 
SRM technologies); see also Anne C. Mulkern, Researcher: Ban Patents on Geoengineering 
Technology, CLIMATEWIRE (Apr. 18, 2012), 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=researcher-ban-patents-on-
geoengineering-technology (quoting a prominent climate engineering researcher calling for 
no patents on SRM technologies) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF 
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
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Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, 
prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and 
mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious 
or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should 
not be used as a reason for postponing such measures, 
taking into account that policies and measures to deal with 
climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global 
benefits at the lowest possible cost . . . .130 
 
The drafters of the UNFCCC likely intended that this principle refer to the 
scientific uncertainty surrounding climate change and its causes. More than 
twenty years later, however, there is much less uncertainty concerning 
climate change, yet lingering uncertainty regarding potential responses.131 
As an analogous example, the precautionary principle could encourage 
hypothetical large multilateral investment in alternative energy research, 
which is a possible yet scientifically uncertain response. Along similar 
lines, this passage can also offer a precautionary case for climate 
engineering research, in which CDR research would be a precautionary 
measure toward minimizing the causes of climate change, and SRM 
research would be one toward mitigating its adverse effects.132 
 The UNFCCC also addresses transboundary environmental harm. 
In the preamble it notes States’ obligations to prevent environmental harm, 
and the agreement later calls for the minimization of the adverse effects of 
combating climate change.133 The UNFCCC thus invokes customary 
international law coupled with a commitment to consider minimizing 
adverse effects.134 States would thus need to undertake certain procedures, 
                                                                                                                           
 130. UNFCCC, supra note 20, art. 3.3 (emphasis added). 
 131. See IPCC, PHYSICAL SCIENCE, supra note 1, § TS.2.1 (discussing advancements in 
scientists’ understanding of the climate change and its causes); Alejandro E. Camacho, 
Adapting Governance to Climate Change: Managing Uncertainty Through a Learning 
Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 4, 10 (2009) (“Extensive evidence confirms that global 
climate change is already occurring . . . . Yet the extent of these impending impacts and the 
exact future distribution of impacts globally and domestically are far from clear.”). 
 132. See generally Jesse L. Reynolds & Floor Fleurke, Climate Engineering Research: 
A Precautionary Response to Climate Change?, 2 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 101 (2013) 
(arguing that the exercise of precaution, particularly as it is embodied in the UNFCCC, calls 
for climate engineering research). 
 133. See UNFCCC, supra note 20, pmbl. (recalling states’ “responsibility to ensure that 
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other 
States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction”); id. art. 4.1(f) (requiring States 
to minimize adverse effects of projects or measures undertaken to mitigate or adapt to 
climate change). 
 134. See id. art. 3, para. 3 (“The Parties should take precautionary measures to 
anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse 
effects.”).  
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including notification, consultation, and cooperation, as well as (arguably) 
impact assessment and subsequent monitoring prior to large-scale climate 
engineering field tests that may have transboundary impacts.135 
 One possible obstacle for climate engineering research is the 
UNFCCC’s prioritization of emissions reductions and the enhancement of 
sinks and reservoirs, processes, which are not affected by SRM.136 
Although the UNFCCC does necessarily exclude other methods of climate 
engineering, it could theoretically condemn climate engineering research if 
it were to undermine the goal of emissions reductions by reducing the 
political willpower for the reductions.137 This interpretation, however, 
requires both the implausible evidence of the basis of decision-makers’ 
behavior and a radical treaty interpretation wherein a complementary action 
would be prohibited if it lessened the magnitude of a committed action.138 
 Independent of the UNFCCC’s text, its related institutions are the 
most likely sites for the top-down development of international norms and 
rules governing climate engineering research.139 This is due to the close 
relevance of the agreement’s subject matter, its universal participation, and 
the bodies created by it, including the Conference of Parties (COP), 
Secretariat, Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, 
and—subsequently formed by the COP—the Technology Executive 
Committee.140 
 
B. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of 
Environmental Modification Techniques 
 
 The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile 
Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD) is another 
highly pertinent MEA, as it is the only binding treaty that directly addresses 
intentional climatic interventions.141 Most industrialized countries are 
                                                                                                                           
 135. See id. art. 4, paras. 1(e), (g), (h), (i), (j) (summarizing procedural responsibilities 
of the Parties).  
 136. See UNFCCC, supra note 20, art. 4.1(b) and (d) (prioritizing the use of sinks and 
reservoirs to reduce greenhouse gases in the atmosphere). 
 137. See Winter, supra note 99, at 288 (arguing that “large-scale research of SRM must 
be prohibited from the outset” because, inter alia, “interpretation the law prohibits measures 
[i.e. climate engineering] that weaken the implementation of Plan A [i.e. emissions 
reduction]”). 
 138. See id. (arguing that customary international law prohibits such an interpretation of 
the UNFCCC). 
 139. See Bodansky, supra note 99, at 313 (“[I]t is likely that the institutions created by 
the Convention would provide the principal international fora for consideration of climate 
engineering proposals.”). 
 140. See id. (discussing the relevant international bodies). 
 141. See ENMOD, supra note 81, art. I.1, III.1 (describing the purpose of ENMOD). 
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Parties to this Convention, but it is considered to be a dormant instrument, 
with neither supporting institutions nor regular meetings.142 Even more so 
than with the UNFCCC, a careful reading of the text reveals a favorable 
legal setting for climate engineering research. Although the definition of 
“environmental modification techniques” includes many forms of climate 
engineering,143 ENMOD prohibits only “engag[ing] in military or any other 
hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, 
long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury 
to any other State Party.”144 ENMOD does not prohibit the research and 
development of potentially hostile environmental modification techniques, 
and it explicitly states that it “shall not hinder the use of environmental 
modification techniques for peaceful purposes.”145 Moreover, ENMOD 
recognizes and encourages peaceful environmental modification: “[Parties] 
[r]ealiz[e] that the use of environmental modification techniques for 
peaceful purposes could improve the interrelationship of man and nature 
and contribute to the preservation and improvement of the environment for 
the benefit of present and future generations . . . .”146 Parties are to 
exchange scientific information regarding peaceful environmental 
modification, and those with the financial means “shall contribute . . . to 
international economic and scientific co-operation in the preservation, 
improvement and peaceful utilization of the environment . . . .”147 If “the 
preservation, improvement and peaceful utilization of the environment” 
were to include reducing climate change risks, the passage could even be 
interpreted as an obligation for industrialized Parties to “contribute” to 
climate engineering research. 
 If a Party were to assert that another’s climate engineering field 
research were hostile and damaging, a complaint under ENMOD would be 
                                                                                                                           
 142. See Arunabha Gosh & Jason Blackstock, Does Geoengineering Need a Global 
Response—and of What Kind? International Aspects of SRM Research Governance 
(SRMGI, background paper, 2011), available at 
http://www.srmgi.org/files/2011/09/SRMGI-International-background-paper.pdf 
(“[ENMOD] has had only two review conferences (1984 and 1992) which updated the 
convention only with non-binding ‘understandings,’ the bulk of its ratifications came in the 
1970s and 1980s . . . and attempts by the General Assembly to have it universally ratified 
have come to naught.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 143. See ENMOD, supra note 81, art. II (“[T]he term ‘environmental modification 
techniques’ refers to any technique for changing—through the deliberate manipulation of 
natural processes—the dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth, including its biota, 
lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of outer space.”). 
 144. Id. art. I.1. 
 145. Id. art. III.1. 
 146. Id. pmbl.  
 147. Id. art. III.2. 
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difficult to enforce.148 The damage would need to occur in the environment 
of the complainant, as ENMOD applies neither to the environments of non-
Parties, to that of the country engaged in the activity, nor to that of non-
state areas.149 The document contains only weak enforcement 
mechanisms.150 Complaints would be lodged with the UN Security Council, 
where any of the five permanent members—who are among the States most 
likely to conduct climate engineering field research—could veto Council 
action.151 Finally, ENMOD is an inactive legal instrument, and no 
complaints have ever been lodged under it. Nevertheless, if “awakened” 
from its dormant state, it is possible that ENMOD could play a role in 
facilitating climate engineering research.152 For example, Parties are to 
consult and cooperate in resolving problems that may arise in the 
implementation of the agreement.153 In addition, its Consultative 
Committee of Experts could be convened and serve as a forum for the 
exchange of relevant information and for the development of norms to 
guide research.154 
 
C. Convention on Biological Diversity 
 
 The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) is an MEA whose 
significance to climate engineering research is not through its text or 
specific commitments per se, but instead through its nearly universal 
participation, its strong institutional support, and the fact that most large 
scale human endeavors affect biodiversity.155 Its provisions are broad, and 
                                                                                                                           
 148. See Charles R. Wunsch, The Environmental Modification Treaty, 4 ASILS INT’L 
L.J. 113, 128–29 (1980) (describing key shortcomings in the enforcement mechanism of 
ENMOD). 
 149. See id. at 128–29 (explaining the reach of ENMOD). 
 150. See id. at 122 (describing the areas critics have frequently cited). 
 151. See ENMOD, supra note 81, art. V (“Any State Party to this Convention which 
has reason to believe that any other State Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving 
from the provisions of the Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of 
the United Nations.”); Wunsch, supra note 148, at 129 (“The problem is the Security 
Council’s action can be vetoed by one of its five permanent members.”). 
 152. See Wunsch, supra note 154, at 131 (outlining the potential positive consequences 
of ENMOD). 
 153. See ENMOD, supra note 81, art. V.1 (“The State Parties to this Convention 
undertake to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems which may arise 
in relation to the objectives of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention.”). 
 154. See id. art. III.2, V.2 (noting additional means of information dispersement, such 
as the Consultative Committee of Experts). 
 155. See CBD, supra note 80, art. 4 (describing the expansive jurisdictional scope of 
the treaty); List of Parties, CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, 
http://www.cbd.int/information/parties.shtml (last visited Mar. 23, 2014) (identifying the 
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some may apply in the context of climate engineering and its research, such 
as the call for Parties to identify and to control activities that have 
“significant adverse impacts” on biodiversity.156 This presents the climate 
change/engineering tension, in that both climate change and climate 
engineering may impact biodiversity. For example, a CBD report concluded 
that climate engineering “could reduce the magnitude of climate change and 
its impacts on biodiversity. At the same time, most geoengineering 
techniques are likely to have unintended impacts on biodiversity.”157 
 This connection would have remained somewhat tenuous, had the 
CBD Conferences of Parties (COP) not addressed climate engineering. At 
the 2008 COP, Parties urged States to ensure that ocean fertilization CDR 
not take place until risks and benefits were better understood and 
regulations were in place, with an exception for “small scale scientific 
research studies within coastal waters.”158 Two years later, it agreed upon a 
broader statement concerning all climate engineering, in which it 
 
[I]nvites Parties and other Governments . . . to 
consider . . . ensur[ing] . . . in the absence of science based, 
global, transparent and effective control and regulatory 
mechanisms for geo-engineering, and in accordance with 
the precautionary approach and Article 14 of the 
Convention, that no climate-related geo-engineering 
activities that may affect biodiversity take place, until there 
is an adequate scientific basis on which to justify such 
activities and appropriate consideration of the associated 
risks for the environment and biodiversity and associated 
social, economic and cultural impacts, with the exception 
of small scale scientific research studies that would be 
conducted in a controlled setting in accordance with Article 
3 of the Convention, and only if they are justified by the 
                                                                                                                 
Convention’s 193 parties) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 156. See CBD, supra note 80, art. 7(c) (“Each Contracting Party shall . . . [i]dentify 
processes and categories of activities which have or are likely to have significant adverse 
impacts on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, and monitor their 
effects through sampling and other techniques.”). 
 157. SECRETARIAT OF THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, CONVENTION ON 
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, TECHNICAL SERIES NO. 66: GEOENGINEERING IN RELATION TO THE 
CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY: TECHNICAL AND REGULATORY MATTERS 14 (Sept. 
2012); see also id. at 8 (citing climate change as one of the “current main drivers of 
biodiversity loss”). 
 158. Ninth Meeting of the Conference of Parties to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, May 19–30, 2008, Decision IX/16—Biodiversity and Climate Change 7, U.N. 
Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/IX/16/C.4 (2008). 
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need to gather specific scientific data and are subject to a 
thorough prior assessment of the potential impacts on the 
environment.159 
 
Although clearly a statement of caution, it is nonbinding for at least three 
reasons. First, as described above, the CBD’s commitments consistently 
utilize soft, qualified language. For example, the article invoked by the 
COP climate engineering decision opens with the phrase “as far as possible 
and as appropriate.”160 Second, the language of this COP decision uses even 
weaker language, merely “invit[ing]” countries “to consider” action.161 
Third, the COP does not have the authority to develop binding law.162 
 
D. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer 
 
 The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and 
its Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer are 
germane to climate engineering because SAI SRM using sulfur dioxide, 
presently the most widely considered injection substance, might damage 
stratospheric ozone.163 Presumably, large scale field research into these 
methods may also have similar effects, and the observation of such impacts 
could be among the goals of research.164 The only existing provision 
contained in these MEAs that may restrict sulfur-based SAI research is that 
Parties to the Vienna Convention are to implement laws “to control, limit, 
reduce or prevent human activities . . . [which] have or are likely to have 
adverse effects resulting from modification or likely modification of the 
ozone layer[,]” wherein “adverse effects” are environmental changes 
“including changes in climate, which have significant deleterious effects on 
                                                                                                                           
 159. Tenth Meeting of the Conference of Parties to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, Oct. 18–29, 2010, Decision X/33—Biodiversity and Climate Change 5, U.N. Doc. 
UNEP/CBD/COP/DECX/33/8(w) (2010). 
 160. CBD, supra note 80, art. 14. 
 161. Tenth Meeting of the Conference of Parties to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, supra note 159, at 5. 
 162. See CBD, supra note 80, art 23 (describing the powers of the COP, which can 
initiate binding protocols and amendments, however, they must be ratified by the Parties). 
 163. See Vienna Convention, supra note 78, art. 2 (outlining the Convention’s 
commitment to protect human health and the environment from the adverse effects of harm 
to the ozone layer); R.L. McKenzie et al., Ozone Depletion and Climate Change: Impacts on 
UV Radiation, 10 PHOTOCHEMICAL & PHOTOBIOLOGICAL SCIS. 182, 189 (2011) (“[T]his geo-
engineering strategy would increase Arctic ozone depletion during the 21st century and 
delay Antarctic ozone recovery by 30 to 70 years.”). 
 164. See THE ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 31 (arguing that this method’s impact 
on ozone needs to be studied further). 
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human health” or the environment.165 This, however probably will not 
restrict climate engineering field research, largely due to the climate 
change/climate engineering tension: climate change itself is expected to 
impact stratospheric ozone in uncertain ways.166 In contrast, the effect of 
SAI SRM on stratospheric ozone remains uncertain and may be relatively 
small.167 Furthermore, the aerosol particles would partially block incoming 
ultraviolet radiation, the increase of which—due to ozone depletion—was 
the original impetus behind the Vienna Convention.168 Thus, it is presently 
unclear whether SAI SRM deployment would cause a net increase or 
decrease in “adverse effects,” but field tests could help resolve this 
question.169  
 Beyond this, the Vienna Convention, as a framework treaty, has 
limited commitments, such as to cooperate in relevant scientific research.170 
In contrast, the Montreal Protocol contains stronger provisions, using a 
“black list” of specific prohibited ozone-depleting substances, which can be 
(and has been) expanded.171 If the Parties to the Montreal Protocol were to 
consider restricting sulfur dioxide SAI SRM research (or deployment), they 
would need to take into account both its potential benefits and risks. 
Moreover, if the Parties wished to restrict sulfur dioxide, they would need 
to implement a novel category dependent upon the purpose, manner, and/or 
location of emissions, because much larger amounts of sulfur dioxide are 
already anthropogenically produced while sulfur-based SAI SRM field 
research would constitute a relatively small contribution.172 
                                                                                                                           
 165. Vienna Convention, supra note 78, art. 1.2, 2.2(b). 
 166. See McKenzie et al., supra note 163, at 188 (“[C]hanges in ozone can induce 
changes in climate, and vice versa.”). 
 167. See T.M.L. Wigley, A Combined Mitigation/Geoengineering Approach to Climate 
Stabilization, 314 SCIENCE 452, 452 (2006) (explaining that the risk of SAI on stratospheric 
ozone “is likely to be small”). 
 168. THE ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 31 (describing aerosol’s reflective 
properties). 
 169. See Wigley, supra note 167, at 452 (noting the contradictory and uncertain effects 
generated from computer models predicting the outcome of SAI SRM deployment). 
 170. See Vienna Convention, supra note 78, art. 2 (outlining the obligations of parties 
to CPOL). 
 171. See Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer art. 2.9, 2.10, 
Sept. 16, 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3 (prohibiting certain substances due to their effect on 
stratospheric ozone). 
 172. See Justin McClellan et al., Cost Analysis of Stratospheric Albedo Modification 
Delivery Systems, 7 ENVTL. RESEARCH LETTERS 034019, 1 (2012) (estimating that full SAI 
SRM implementation would inject one to five teragrams of sulfur per year, which would be 
spread globally); S.J. Smith et al., Anthropogenic Sulfur Dioxide Emissions: 1850–2005, 11 
ATMOSPHERIC CHEMISTRY & PHYSICS 1101, 1110 (2011) (placing actual global 
anthropogenic sulfur emissions at approximately fifty-eight teragrams per year, which are 
concentrated in North America and Europe). 
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 In fact, it is possible to argue that the Vienna Convention favors 
climate engineering research. As noted above, climate change will impact 
the ozone layer.173 Parties must “take appropriate measures . . . . to protect 
human health and the environment against adverse effects resulting or 
likely to result from human activities which modify or are likely to modify 
the ozone layer.”174 Climate engineering has the potential to reduce the 
adverse effects of climate change and secondarily may be able to reduce 
harm from stratospheric ozone depletion.175 Specifically, the Vienna 
Convention commits Parties to undertake and cooperate in “research and 
scientific assessment on: The physical and chemical processes that may 
affect the ozone layer . . . [c]limatic effects deriving from any modifications 
of the ozone layer . . . [and] [s]ubstances, practices, processes and activities 
that may affect the ozone layer, and their cumulative effects.”176 In this 
context, sulfur dioxide is a substance and SAI SRM climate engineering is 
an activity that may affect the ozone layer and the climate. If there is a 
significant probability that SAI SRM might be deployed in the future, then 
research into the proposed techniques would improve understanding of its 
potential impact on stratospheric ozone.177 
 
E. Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution 
 
 The Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution 
(LRTAP Convention) is a framework agreement, supplemented with 
protocols, which was developed under the auspices of the UN Economic 
Commission for Europe (UNECE) in order to reduce acid rain due to 
transboundary air pollution.178 With respect to climate engineering in 
general, the LRTAP Convention encourages research.179 Notably, 
                                                                                                                           
 173. See McKenzie, supra note 166, at 183 (describing the negative effects that climate 
change may have). 
 174. See Vienna Convention, supra note 78, art. 2.1 (obligating Parties to actively try 
and reduce the adverse effects of modifications to stratospheric ozone). 
 175. See supra notes 24–34 and accompanying text (describing the emergence of 
climate engineering). 
 176. Id. art. 3; see also art. 2.2(a), 4, Annex I (encouraging similar research to better 
understand the impact that human activities have on the ozone layer). 
 177. See THE ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 25, at ix (advocating research into “whether 
low risk methods can be made available if it becomes necessary to reduce the rate of 
warming this century”). 
 178. See LRTAP Convention, supra note 74, art. 2 (listing the fundamental principles 
of the LRTAP Convention). The United States, Canada, and the majority of European 
countries are Parties to the LRTAP Convention. See 1302 U.N.T.S. 217, n.1 (noting which 
countries have ratified the LRTAP Convention). 
 179. See id. art. 7 (advising parties to the convention to undertake research and 
development of existing and proposed technologies). 
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greenhouse gases and global warming likely qualify under the Convention 
as “long-range transboundary air pollution”: 
 
“Air Pollution” means the introduction by man, directly or 
indirectly, of substances or energy into the air resulting in 
deleterious effects of such a nature as to endanger human 
health, harm living resources and ecosystems and material 
property and impair or interfere with amenities and other 
legitimate uses of the environment . . . .180 
 
This definition appears to require that “deleterious effects” have already 
occurred, which is arguably the case with climate change.181 The “long-
range transboundary” qualifier adds requirements for transboundary effects 
and for multiple individual sources that cannot readily be distinguished.182 
Given this, the LRTAP Convention can be seen as encouraging climate 
engineering research in three ways. First, it commits Parties to conduct and 
cooperate in research, including in the “economic, social and environmental 
assessment[s] of alternative measures for attaining environmental 
objectives including the reduction of long-range transboundary air 
pollution.”183 Climate engineering is an alternative measure for reducing 
global warming, which would likely be considered a long-range 
transboundary air pollutant.184 Second, recalling that SRM is projected to 
have low financial costs, this technique should fall within the commitment 
that, “in order to combat air pollution [Parties are] to develop the best 
policies and strategies . . . in particular by using the best available 
technology which is economically feasible and low- and non-waste 
technology.”185 Third, in its 1994 Oslo Protocol,186 “precautionary 
measures” are not only meant to “prevent or minimize emissions of air 
                                                                                                                           
 180. Id. art. 1; see also SANDS & PEEL, supra note 74, at 247 (discussing this 
definitional issue). 
 181. See LRTAP Convention, supra note 74, art. 5 (“Consultations shall be 
held . . . between, on the one hand, Contracting Parties which are actually affected 
by . . . long-range transboundary air pollution and, on the other hand, Contracting Parties 
within which and subject to whose jurisdiction a significant contribution to long-range 
transboundary air pollution originates . . . .”). 
 182. See id. art. 1 (defining long-range transboundary air pollution). 
 183. Id. art. 7. 
 184. See id. art. 1 (defining “long-range transboundary air pollution” to include effects 
that “endanger human health, harm living resources and ecosystems”). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on 
Further Reduction of Sulphur Emissions, June 13, 1994, 2030 U.N.T.S. 122 [hereinafter 
Oslo Protocol]. 
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pollutants” but also to “mitigate their adverse effects” and “should be cost-
effective.”187 
 Field experiments of sulfur-based SAI SRM present a special case 
for the LRTAP Convention treaty regime, with the 1985 Helsinki,188 1994 
Oslo, and 1999 Gothenburg Protocols being applicable.189 Most 
importantly, the Gothenburg Protocol contains restrictions regarding “new 
stationary sources.”190 These new stationary sources must not exceed 
certain sulfur emission limits which vary by categories such as combustion 
plants and oil refineries.191 Of course, it is possible that the Implementation 
Committee, which reviews compliance, and the governing Executive Body 
could exempt sulfur-based SAI SRM field tests from the Gothenburg 
Protocol restrictions because the production of acid rain within the covered 
UNECE region from this source of sulfur would be minimal due to the high 
emission altitude and subsequent atmospheric mixing.192 Furthermore, there 
are a few exceptions to the sulfur emission limits for which the field tests 
might qualify.193 Nevertheless, barring action by the LRTAP Convention 
                                                                                                                           
 187. Id. at pmbl. ¶¶ 3, 4. 
 188. Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on 
the Reduction of Sulphur Emissions or Their Transboundary Fluxes By at Least 30 Per Cent, 
July 8, 1985, 1480 U.N.T.S. 215 [hereinafter Helsinki Protocol]. 
 189. Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution to 
Abate Acidification, Eutrophication and Ground-level Ozone, Nov. 30, 1999, 2319 U.N.T.S. 
81 [hereinafter Gothenburg Protocol]. A handful of States, including some larger ones, are 
not parties to these protocols. Most importantly, the United States has not ratified the Oslo 
Protocol, nor has Russia. See Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution on Further Reduction of Sulphur Emissions, UNITED NATIONS 
TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?sr c=TREA 
TY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-1-e&chapter=27&lang=en (last visited May 7, 2014, 1:44 PM) 
(listing the countries that have ratified the Oslo Protocol). Canada has not ratified the 
Gothenburg Protocol, nor has Russia. See UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-1-
h&chapter=27&lang=en (last visited May 7, 2014, 1:48 PM) (listing the parties that have 
ratified the Gothenberg Protocol). 
 190. See Gothenburg Protocol, supra note 189, art. 1 (defining new stationary sources). 
 191. See id. art. 3.2, Annex IV (establishing limits on sulfur emissions from stationary 
sources). New mobile sources are similarly regulated. See id. art. 3.5, Annex VIII 
(establishing limit values and “environmental specifications for marketed fuels for 
vehicles”). SAI tests do not seem to fall clearly into any particular category. 
 192. See id. art. 9 (discussing the powers of the Implementation Committee); id. art. 10 
(requiring review of “data on the effects of concentrations and depositions of sulphur and 
nitrogen compounds and of photochemical pollution”); see also IPCC, PHYSICAL SCIENCE, 
supra note 1, FAQ 7.3 (“There has also been some concern that sulphate aerosol SRM 
would increase acid rain, but model studies suggest that acid rain is probably not a major 
concern since the rate of acid rain production from stratospheric aerosol SRM would be 
much smaller than values currently produced by pollution sources.”). 
 193. See Gothenburg Protocol, supra note 189, Annex IV, tbl.1, n.a (providing a short 
list of exceptions to the limit values). 
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institutions and possible exceptions, these sulfur-based SAI SRM field tests 
appear to be prohibited in the Parties’ territory by the Gothenburg 
Protocol.194 
 More generally, sulfur-based SAI SRM field experiments would be 
regulated as a contribution to each Party’s total emissions.195 For example, 
they would be subject to reporting requirements, which are disaggregated 
by source categories and approximate locations.196 Further implications for 
sulfur-based SAI SRM field experiments would depend on their scale 
because, although sulfur-based SAI SRM would be a small contribution to 
global sulfur emissions, large experiments could greatly increase total 
emissions of individual countries.197 At small scales, such field tests would 
be generally encouraged per the provisions cited above and by the Oslo 
Protocol’s commitment for Parties to “encourage research, development, 
monitoring and cooperation related to . . . [t]he understanding of the wider 
effects of sulfur emissions on human health, the environment.”198 Field tests 
of sulfur-based SAI SRM large enough to significantly increase a country’s 
total emissions may be prohibited by the softly-worded commitment in the 
LRTAP Convention that Parties are to “endeavor to limit and, as far as 
possible, gradually reduce and prevent air pollution”199 and by the first 
                                                                                                                           
 194. See id. art. 2 (stating the objectives of the Protocol, which include reducing sulfur 
emissions). 
 195. See generally LRTAP Convention, supra note 74 (addressing how Parties’ 
emissions into the atmosphere are regulated). 
 196. See id. art. 8 (providing for an exchange of information for Parties to the 
agreement); Helsinki Protocol, supra note 188, art. 4 (requiring annual reporting of sulfur 
emission levels); Oslo Protocol, supra note 187, art. 5 (requiring periodic reporting of 
national annual sulfur emissions); Gothenburg Protocol, supra note 189, art. 7 (requiring 
periodic reporting of sulfur emissions). The Executive Body of the Convention determines 
the source categories, and the locations are in “grid-units of agreed size.” See LRTAP 
Convention, supra note 74, art. 10 (establishing an “Executive Body” and defining the 
parameters of its authority). 
 197. See Gothenburg Protocol, supra note 189, Annex IV (establishing limit values for 
sulfur emissions from stationary sources). Assuming that a large-scale field test would be 
one-tenth the magnitude of deployment, and taking the midpoint of the estimated range for 
deployment, such a test could emit 0.3 teragrams of sulfur per year. See MacMynowski et 
al., supra note 54, at 5044 (calculating to what extent uncertainty could be reduced through 
an SRM field test of one-tenth of the deployment intensity needed to counteract the warming 
from a doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration); McClellan et al., supra note 
172, § 2.1 (estimating the amount of sulfur needed for SAI SRM deployment). This would 
be 1.5 times the current sulfur emissions of the United Kingdom or Germany. See EUROPEAN 
ENVT. AGENCY, EUROPEAN UNION EMISSION INVENTORY REPORT 1990–2010 UNDER THE 
UNECE CONVENTION ON LONG-RANGE TRANSBOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION 52–54 (2012) 
(discussing current sulfur emissions of European countries). 
 198. Oslo Protocol, supra note 187, art. 6; see also supra notes 182–191 and 
accompanying text. 
 199. LRTAP Convention, supra note 74, art. 2. 
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obligation of the Oslo Protocol that its Parties “shall control and reduce 
their sulfur emissions.”200 These tests would furthermore be contrary to the 
objective of the Gothenburg Protocol.201 In reality, Parties sometimes do 
have significant increases in their total emissions while remaining below 
their emission reduction commitments.202 The Implementation Committee, 
however, has apparently not addressed these significant below-limit 
increases in its reports to the Executive Body.203 Such a below-limit 
increase would most likely be judged by the other Parties and the 
Implementation Committee in its full context, including whether high-
altitude sulfate emissions from tests would be deposited within the Parties’ 
territory or, alternatively, would be diluted and deposited over a much 
larger area.204 If field tests would be “a significant contribution to long-
range transboundary air pollution,” then a potentially affected state could 
request consultations with the source state.205 Field tests of sulfur-based 
SAI SRM that would cause a Party to the Oslo or Gothenburg Protocols to 
exceed its sulfur emissions limit would be prohibited.206 
 
F. Outer Space Treaty 
 
 The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other 
                                                                                                                           
 200. Oslo Protocol, supra note 187, art. 2.1; see also arts. 2.4, 4.1(b) (discussing the 
commitments to reduce emissions). 
 201. See Gothenburg Protocol, supra note 189, art. 2.1 (stating the Protocol’s objective 
to reduce sulfur emissions). 
 202. See European Environment Agency, supra note 197, at 11–12 (discussing 
siginificant emissions increases from 1990 to 2010); Oslo Protocol, supra note 187, Annex 
II (creating sulfur ceilings but not addressing significant below-limit increases); Gothenburg 
Protocol, supra note 189, Annex II (establishing sulfur ceilings but, again, not addressing 
significant below-limit increases). 
 203. See, e.g., Fifteenth Report of the Implementation Committee to the Executive 
Body for the Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution, 31st Sess., Dec. 11–
13, 2012, ECE/EB.AIR/2012/16 (reporting on the implementation of the LRTAP 
Convention) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 204. See generally LRTAP Convention, supra note 74 (establishing parameters for 
evaluating increases in sulfur emissions). 
 205. See id. art. 5 (requiring consultations “upon request, at an early stage, 
between, . . . Parties which are actually affected by or exposed to a significant risk of long-
range transboundary air pollution and, on the other hand, Contracting Parties within 
which . . . long-range transboundary air pollution originates”). 
 206. See Oslo Protocol, supra note 187, Annex II (providing limits for sulfur 
emissions); Gothenburg Protocol, supra note 189, Annex II (providing new limits for sulfur 
emissions as of 1999). For example, Germany and the United Kingdom could presently 
perform experiments where they emit up to one sixth and one third of their allotted sulfur 
emissions respectively. See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
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Celestial Bodies (the Outer Space Treaty) is the most important 
international instrument in space law.207 All nations that have a space 
program are Parties to the Outer Space Treaty.208 Proposals to place objects 
in space, either in Earth or solar orbit, have long been considered potential 
SRM methods, in part because they could be very effective and would not 
interfere directly in ecosystems, even though they are consistently assessed 
as economically infeasible.209 Evaluating the role of international law for 
space-based climate engineering research is complicated by the fact that, to 
a greater degree than other suggested methods, there could be little 
distinction between field research and deployment. 
 In general, the Outer Space Treaty and related agreements permit 
research on space-based SRM methods by, for example, establishing 
“freedom of scientific investigation in outer space,” and committing States 
to cooperate therein.210 Parties are to conduct space activities “for the 
benefit and in the interests of all countries”211 and “with due regard to the 
corresponding interests of all other States Parties.”212 A subsequent UN 
General Assembly resolution addressed this potentially unclear passage, 
indicating that it is intended to encourage consideration of developing 
countries’ needs and to stimulate voluntary cooperation, and not to imply 
veto rights on other countries’ activities in space.213 The Outer Space Treaty 
                                                                                                                           
 207. See generally Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Dec. 
19, 1966, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]; THE UNITED NATIONS AT 
WORK 41 (Martin Ira Glassner ed., 1998) (“The most important of the UN space law 
instrumetns has been the [Outer Space Treaty] . . . .”). 
 208. See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and 
Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, UNITED NATIONS 
TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/showDetails.aspx? 
objid=0800000280128cbd (last visited May 7, 2014, 2:12 PM) (listing parties to the Outer 
Space Treaty) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 209. See THE ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 32–34 (explaining that light refraction 
from space could be a possible SRM method, however, it would be prohibitively expensive). 
 210. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 207, art. I (“There shall be freedom of 
scientific investigation in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, and 
States shall facilitate and encourage international cooperation in such investigation.”). 
 211. Id. art. I.  
 212. Id. art. IX. 
 213. See generally Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use 
of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into Particular 
Account the Needs of Developing Countries, G.A. Res. 122, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. 
No. 49, at 114, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/122 (Dec. 13, 1966) (addressing the obligations and 
powers of States with space programs and States without space programs under the Outer 
Space Treaty); see also FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE, 63–65 
(2009) (explaining the prevailing desire, particularly among countries with space programs, 
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requires communication, that is, to inform the UN, the scientific 
community, and the public about relevant activities.214 Finally, other 
international laws, including the customary law regarding transboundary 
harm, also apply in space.215 
 The most detailed applicable provisions under space law are those 
regarding liability, which could present a disincentive toward researching 
space-based SRM.216 The Outer Space Treaty and the Convention on 
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects hold Parties 
responsible for their space-based activities and absolutely liable for damage 
caused by launched objects.217 This liability is not restricted to accidents, 
malfunctions, or to damage from direct contact with launched objects, but 
instead includes damage from objects that remain in orbit and continue to 
function as intended.218 Because the definition of “damage” is limited to 
that occurring to persons and property, recoverable damage to the 
environment would include only its economic value possessed by natural or 
legal persons.219 The agreements, however, are silent on how direct the 
causation must be.220 Scholars generally agree that indirect and nonphysical 
damage is covered, but have divergent opinions regarding how direct the 
                                                                                                                 
that the benefit and interests be “met simply by the activities being beneficial in a 
generalised way”). 
 214. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 207, art. XI (instituting a requirement that 
signatory Parties report to the UN Secretary General, and inform the public and scientific 
community of the nature of their interstellar activities). 
 215. See id. art. III (placing the Outer Space Treaty under the purview of international 
law). 
 216. See id. art. VII (establishing liability for any state that launches objects into space). 
 217. See Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 
pt. B, art. II, Nov. 29, 1971, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Space Liability Convention] 
(creating absolute liability for damage to the surface of Earth or to aircraft). 
 218. See Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, princ. 8, G.A. Res. 1962, U.N. GAOR 18th Sess., 
Supp. No. 15, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/RES/18/1962 (Dec. 13, 1963) (“[E]ach State from whose 
territory or facility an object is launched, is internationally liable for damage to a foreign 
State or to its natural or juridical persons by such object or its component parts on the Earth, 
in air space, or in outer space.”). The Outer Space Treaty and the Space Liability Convention 
make no reference to accidents or malfunctions nor to direct physical contact, but States are 
“internationally liable for damage to a foreign State or to its natural or juridical persons by 
such object or its component parts on the Earth, in air space, or in outer space.” Id. ¶ 8. 
 219. See Space Liability Convention, supra note 217, art. I(a) (“The term ‘damage’ 
means loss of life, personal injury or other impairment of health; or loss of or damage to 
property of States or of persons, natural or juridical, or property of international 
intergovernmental organizations.”); see also LOTTA VIIKARI, THE ENVIRONMENTAL ELEMENT 
IN SPACE LAW: ASSESSING THE PRESENT AND CHARTING THE FUTURE 68–69 (2008) 
(discussing the scope of liability created under the Space Liability Convention). 
 220. See, e.g., Space Liability Convention, supra note 217, art. XII (invoking 
“international law and the principles of justice and equity,” and implying inclusion of 
indirectly-caused and delayed damages). 
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causation must be.221 This disagreement is further complicated by the fact 
that proving causation in a dispute over the effects of space-based SRM 
testing or deployment would be very difficult. It is important to note that 
the Space Liability Convention has an article concerning catastrophic risks 
from space objects that requires the responsible state to “examine the 
possibility of rendering appropriate and rapid assistance.”222 
 
G. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
 
 The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is a 
comprehensive international agreement describing the rights and duties of 
States in their marine activities, including the protection of the marine 
environment and the conduct of marine scientific research.223 Some 
proposed climate engineering methods and their field research would occur 
in or over the ocean, such as ocean fertilization, MCB, and (possibly) 
SAI.224 UNCLOS also applies to land-based activities that affect the marine 
environment.225 States under UNCLOS have rights and obligations that will 
impact climate engineering field experiments in a complex manner.226 
 The desire to protect the marine environment is evident throughout 
UNCLOS, under which “States have the obligation to protect and preserve 
the marine environment.”227 This is without qualification and exception. 
Furthermore, Parties have obligations “to take . . . such measures . . . for the 
living resources of the high seas . . . to prevent, reduce and control pollution 
                                                                                                                           
 221. Compare W.F. Foster, The Convention on International Liability for Damage 
Caused by Space Objects, 10 CAN. YEARBOOK INT’L L. 137, 158 (1972) (discussing liability 
for damages caused by space objects), with Carl Q. Christol, International Liability for 
Damage Caused by Space Objects, 74 AM. J. INT’L L. 346, 358–62 (1980) (reviewing 
various interpretations of the Treaty). Scholars generally agree that indirect and nonphysical 
damage is covered, however. See Foster, supra, at 155 (“Moreover, it is immaterial whether 
the injuries are suffered through physical impact . . . .”); Christol, supra, at 362 (“[I]t may be 
anticipated that the convention will be interpreted as covering both direct and indirect 
damage . . . .”).    
 222. See Space Liability Convention, supra note 217, art. XXI (establishing state 
responsibility for catastrophic injury). 
 223. See generally UNCLOS, supra note 73 (setting out the rights and obligations of 
any state that engages activities on the seas). 
 224. See supra notes 23–45 and accompanying text (providing an overview of such 
methods). 
 225. See UNCLOS, supra note 73, art. 207 (“States shall adopt laws and regulations to 
prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from land-based 
sources . . . .” ). 
 226. See generally id. (discussing, at length, the rights and obligations of States with 
respect to the seas). 
 227. Id. art. 192. 
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of the marine environment from any source . . . .”;228 to ensure “that 
activities under their jurisdiction or control are so conducted as not to cause 
damage by pollution to other States and their environment, and that 
pollution arising from incidents or activities under their jurisdiction or 
control does not spread beyond the areas where they exercise sovereign 
rights . . . .”229; and to “take all measures necessary to prevent, reduce and 
control pollution of the marine environment resulting from the use of 
technologies under their jurisdiction or control . . . .”230 The States are also 
required to assess and to communicate the expected effects of “substantial 
pollution of or significant and harmful changes to the marine environment” 
caused by activities under their control.231 Importantly, “pollution of the 
marine environment” is defined, as in the LRTAP Convention, to include 
“the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into 
the marine environment,”232 but in this case with a lower threshold of 
certainty.233 This definition includes greenhouse gases and probably global 
warming.234 Under UNCLOS, pollution is not limited to marine-based 
sources, although the pollution must enter the marine environment.235 
Furthermore, States are to prevent marine pollution “from any source” 
including “from land-based sources [or] from or through the 
atmosphere.”236 Not only will climate change warm the ocean, but elevated 
atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations will also acidify it, and both 
processes will have deleterious effects.237 These effects imply a need to 
balance the risks to the marine environment from climate engineering 
research with those from climate change. UNCLOS, however, provides that 
“States shall act so as not to transfer, directly or indirectly, damage or 
hazards from one area to another or transform one type of pollution into 
                                                                                                                           
 228. Id. art. 117. 
 229. Id. art. 194. 
 230. Id. art. 196. 
 231. See id. arts. 204–06 (discussing monitoring and assessing effects on the marine 
environment). 
 232. Id. art. 1.1(4). 
 233. See supra note 180 and accompanying text (providing the LRTAP Convention 
definition). 
 234. See UNCLOS, supra note 73, art. 1 (including “deleterious effects as harm to 
living resources and marine life, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine 
activities, . . . impairment of quality for use of sea water and reduction of amenities” in the 
definition of pollution to the marine environment). 
 235. See id. art. 204 (“States shall . . . observe, measure, evaluate and analyse, by 
recognized scientific methods, the risks or effects of pollution of the marine environment.”). 
 236. Id. art. 194. 
 237. See IPCC, IMPACTS, supra note 16, § 6 (“Climate change alters physical, chemical, 
and biological properties of the ocean . . . Impacts of ocean acidification range from changes 
in organismal physiology and behavior to population dynamics . . . . and will affect marine 
ecosystems for centuries if emissions continue.”). 
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another.”238 Scholars dispute this article’s impact on climate engineering.239 
Regardless of its impact, research projects of limited scale would not have 
the intention of transferring hazards, but of learning whether climate 
engineering deployment would have deleterious effects on the environment 
and whether it would indeed transfer hazards.240 
 UNCLOS is generally supportive of scientific research at sea.241 
Although “marine scientific research” remains undefined under UNCLOS, 
the various definitions considered during negotiations and proposed after 
the text was finalized all included the research of climate engineering 
techniques, which intervene in the ocean, and likely also those that operate 
in the atmosphere above the ocean.242 For example, one of the last proposed 
                                                                                                                           
 238. UNCLOS, supra note 73, art. 195. 
 239. Compare Philomene Verlaan, Geo-Engineering, the Law of the Sea, and Climate 
Change, 2009 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 446, 457–58 (2009) (arguing that climate 
engineering projects would likely violate article 195, and that the burden is on the projects’ 
proponents to demonstrate that it would not), with James Edward Peterson, Can Algae Save 
Civilization: A Look at Technology, Law, and Policy Regarding Iron Fertilization of the 
Ocean to Counteract the Greenhouse Effect, 6 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 61, 92 
(1995) (asserting that article 195 would apply only if the intervention ocean fertilization 
were to be shown to have harmful environmental effects). 
 240. See THE ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 25, at ix (stating that one purpose of research 
is to avoid “methods which involve activities or effects that extend beyond national 
boundaries”); but see GREGOR BETZ ET AL., LARGE SCALE INTENTIONAL INTERVENTIONS INTO 
THE CLIMATE SYSTEM?: ASSESSING THE CLIMATE ENGINEERING DEBATE 31 (Wilfried Rickels 
et al. eds., 2011), available at 
http://www.fona.de/mediathek/pdf/Climate_Engineering_engl.pdf (“By carrying out 
research into and planning for climate engineering, one passes on risks that arise today to 
future generations.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 241. See UNCLOS, supra note 73, pmbl. ¶ 4, arts. 87.1, 88, 238–239, 243, 251, 255, 
257 (recognizing the importance of supporting research at sea). 
 242. See UNITED NATIONS DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, 
OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, THE LAW OF THE SEA: MARINE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH: A REVISED 
GUIDE TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 4–6 (2010) (reviewing definitions of marine scientific 
research which were considered during drafting); see also GEORGE K. WALKER, DEFINITIONS 
FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA: TERMS NOT DEFINED BY THE 1982 CONVENTION 241–44 (2011) 
(discussing the meanings of marine scientific research). Whether research is conducted in, 
on, or above the high seas does not matter; although it is unclear under UNCLOS whether 
research conducted in the atmosphere above a nation’s exclusive economic zone and 
continental shelves is considered marine research. See FLORIAN H. TH. WEGELEIN, MARINE 
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH: THE OPERATION AND STATUS OF RESEARCH VESSELS AND OTHER 
PLATFORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 251–255 (2005) (discussing the legal regime of air 
space located over the high seas, contiguous zones, and exclusive economic zones). The 
most relevant question, however, is whether climate engineering research would increase 
knowledge of the “marine environment,” a phrase that is undefined but generally interpreted 
to include the marine atmosphere. See ALFRED H.A. SOONS, MARINE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 
AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 124 (1982) (analyzing the meaning of “marine scientific 
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definitions to be included in a negotiating text was “any study or related 
experimental work designed to increase man’s knowledge of the marine 
environment.”243 Parties commit to promote marine scientific research and 
to create favorable conditions for it, as well as to promote cooperation and 
communication in research.244 It must be conducted “using appropriate 
scientific methods and means,” for peaceful purposes, in a manner 
consistent with other international law, and in a manner that does not 
“unjustifiably interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea.”245 Most 
pertinently, Parties’ right to research is subject to their obligation to protect 
the marine environment.246 States and sponsoring international 
organizations may be held liable for damage caused by pollution due to 
research or by actions in contravention of the agreement.247 
 Some of the rights and obligations concerning marine scientific 
research vary by the location of the proposed activity.248 Within territorial 
waters,249 coastal States “have the exclusive right to regulate, authorize and 
conduct marine scientific research,” and research therein requires their 
express consent.250 In the exclusive economic zones and continental 
shelves, coastal States have a similar right, but they are to grant consent “in 
                                                                                                                 
research”); see also VERONICA FRANK, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND MARINE 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA: IMPLEMENTING 
GLOBAL OBLIGATIONS AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL 12 (2007) (discussing the lack of definition 
for “marine environment”). Regardless, considering the expected impact of climate change 
and climate engineering on the ocean, atmospheric climate engineering research would 
qualify as marine scientific research. See Karen N. Scott, Regulating Ocean Fertilization 
Under International Law: The Risks, CARBON AND CLIMATE L. REV. 108, 109–10 (2013) 
(describing the impacts of climate change and fertilization on the ocean). 
 243. Informal Single Negotiating Text, Third United Nations Conference on the Law of 
the Sea, Part III, Part II, art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8/Part III (1982). 
 244. See UNCLOS, supra note 73, arts. 239, 242–44, 250 (providing that States shall 
promote and facilitate marine scientific research in accordance with the Convention). 
 245. Id. art. 240 (providing general principles for scientific research). 
 246. See id. arts. 192, 238 (discussing States’ general obligation to protect the marine 
environment and States’ rights to conduct scientific research). 
 247. See id. art. 263 (“States . . . shall be responsible and liable for the measures they 
take in contravention of this Convention . . . . States . . . shall be responsible and liable 
pursuant to article 235 for damage caused by pollution of the marine environment arising out 
of marine scientific research undertaken by them or on their behalf.”). If a climate 
engineering research activity were to be considered “pollution of the marine environment” 
instead of “marine scientific research,” liability would be independent of any violation of 
law. See id. art. 235 (“[States] shall be liable in accordance with international law.”). 
 248. See id. arts. 245–46 (explaining scientific research rights available in the territorial 
sea, the exclusive economic zone, and the continental shelf). 
 249. See id. art. 2 (“The sovereignty of a coastal State extends . . . to an adjacent belt of 
sea, described as the territorial sea.”). 
 250. See id. art. 245 (providing guidelines for marine scientific research in a States’ 
territorial sea).  
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normal circumstances” to researching States and “competent international 
organizations.”251 There, the coastal State must exercise this and other 
rights with due regard for other States, and the researching State must have 
due regard for the coastal State and comply with the coastal State’s laws 
and regulations.252 On the high seas, States and international organizations 
have the right to conduct research, but this must be performed with due 
regard for other States.253 Research conducted within the “Area”254 is 
subject to additional requirements, particularly that it is “for the common 
benefit of mankind as a whole” and that results are shared.255 
 A special note must be made of ocean fertilization and its research, 
which may or may not qualify as “dumping.” As defined in UNCLOS, 
“dumping,” in part, is “any deliberate disposal of wastes or other 
matter . . . at sea,” but excludes “placement of matter for a purpose other 
than the mere disposal thereof.”256 UNCLOS Parties have committed to 
prevent, reduce, and control pollution of the sea by dumping.257 Coastal 
States have the right to permit, regulate, and control dumping within their 
territorial waters, exclusive economic zones, and continental shelf, but must 
consider how other States may be impacted.258 Parties are to establish 
global rules regarding dumping, and their national laws must be no less 




                                                                                                                           
 251. See id. art. 246 (providing guidelines for marine scientific research in the exclusive 
economic zone and the continental shelf). UNCLOS details circumstances under which 
coastal States may withhold their consent, as well as the duties of the States and international 
organizations who conduct such research. See id. arts. 246–49, 252–54 (detailing state and 
researchers’ rights and obligations concerning marine environmental research). 
 252. See id. arts. 56, 58 (discussing the rights and duties of various States within the 
exclusive economic zone). 
 253. See id. arts. 87, 257 (providing for the freedom to research on the high seas and the 
right to perform research beyond exclusive economic zones). 
 254. See id. art. 1 (“‘Area’ means the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”).  
 255. See id. art. 143 (covering permissible marine scientific research in the Area). 
 256. Id. art. 1.1(5). 
 257. See id. arts. 194.3(a), 210 (requiring States to take measures against pollution of 
the marine environment, including dumping). 
 258. See id. art. 210.5 (providing guidelines for dumping in certain areas). Dumping by 
other States in these areas requires permission from the coastal state. See id. (“Dumping 
within the territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone or onto the continental shelf shall 
not be carried out without the express prior approval of the coastal State . . . .”). 
 259. See id. arts. 210.4, 210.6 (discussing the establishment and effectiveness of 
Parties’ global, regional, and national rules concerning pollution). 
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H. London Convention and London Protocol 
 
 The London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by 
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter and its London Protocol (together, 
the LC-LP) are two MEAs that regulate dumping at sea.260 The former has 
eighty-seven parties, whereas the latter—intended to replace the former—
currently has forty-two parties.261 These MEAs use essentially the same 
definition for “dumping” as UNCLOS; thus, ocean fertilization could 
potentially be classified under these MEAs as dumping.262 In response to a 
private company that intended to conduct field experiments using a flag of 
convenience and a negative assessment of ocean fertilization in the Fourth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the 
Contracting Parties to the LC-LP took up the issue and began to develop a 
nonbinding regulatory framework for ocean fertilization.263 
 The regulatory framework adopted by the LC-LP Parties rests upon 
two new definitions provided in their 2008 decision. First, “ocean 
fertilization is any activity . . . with the principle intention of stimulating 
primary productivity in the oceans [excluding] conventional aquaculture, or 
                                                                                                                           
 260. See generally Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of 
Wastes and Other Matter art. I, Nov. 13, 1972, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinafter London 
Convention] (providing the terms of the London Convention, requiring States to prevent 
pollution of the sea caused by dumping); Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of 
Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 1972 art. 3.4, Nov. 7, 1996, 11 
U.K.T.S. Cm. 4078 [hereinafter London Protocol] (adopting stricter measures for preventing 
dumping). 
 261. See Office for the London Convention and Protocol, London Convention and 
Protocol, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.imo.org/blast/mainframemenu.asp?topic_id=1488 (last visited Jan. 8, 2014) 
(listing signatories) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 262. Compare UNCLOS, supra note 73, art 1.1(5) (defining “dumping”), with London 
Convention, supra note 260, art. III.1 (defining actions that “dumping” does and does not 
include), and London Protocol, supra note 260, art. 1.4 (same). The two definitions differ in 
ways that are not relevant to this paper, but the London Convention preceded UNCLOS and 
is thus the origin of the definition. 
 263. Russ George, the CEO of Planktos, Inc. threatened to use a flag of convenience 
after the Environmental Protection Agency, which is responsible for implementing the 
London Convention in the United States, sent a letter to the company. See United States, 
Planktos, Inc., Large-scale Ocean Iron Addition Projects, I.M.O. Doc. LC/SG 30/INF.28 
(June 1, 2007) (discussing Planktos Inc.’s dispute with the EPA over ocean iron addition 
projects); Report of the Thirtieth Meeting of the Scientific Group of the London Convention 
and the First Meeting of the Scientific Group of the London Protocol, ¶ 2.22, I.M.O. Doc. 
LC/SG 31/16 (July 25, 2007) (reporting on the decision-making process of the LC-LP in its 
regulation of ocean fertilization); see also Resolution LC-LP.1 on the Regulation of Ocean 
Fertilization pmbl. ¶ 3, I.M.O. Doc. LC 10/16/Annex 6 (Oct. 31, 2008) [hereinafter LC-
LP.1] (noting that States are encouraged to study and understand ocean iron fertilization). 
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mariculture, or the creation of artificial reefs.”264 The Parties decided that 
ocean fertilization indeed falls within the scope of the LC-LP and that it, in 
general, should not be allowed.265 An exception to this prohibition was 
made for the second new definition, “legitimate scientific research.”266 
Distinguishing legitimate scientific research from illegitimate ocean 
fertilization requires an assessment framework, described in the Parties’ 
2010 decision.267 Under this framework, researchers apply to the 
appropriate regulatory agency of their home state for approval to conduct 
scientific research.268 
The assessment consists of two stages. The first is an initial review 
to determine whether the proposal is, in fact, a scientific one that would be 
subject to peer review and would not result in financial gain for the 
researchers.269 The second is a more elaborate environmental assessment, 
which includes, among other things, an assessment of exposure effects, risk 
characterization, and risk management.270 Notably, the risk management 
procedures should be based on a “precautionary approach,” and the 
decision whether to reject the proposal or to ask for revisions should take 
into account this precautionary approach.271 During the second phase, the 
researching Party is also to notify potentially affected countries, and to 
                                                                                                                           
 264. LC-LP.1, supra note 263, ¶ 2 n.3. Primary production is the creation of organic 
matter from carbon dioxide, usually through photosynthesis. See THE ROYAL SOCIETY, supra 
note 25, at 79 (defining primary production as “[a]ll forms of production accomplished by 
plants”). 
 265. See LC-LP.1, supra note 263, ¶ 8 (“[O]cean fertilization activities other than 
legitimate scientific research should not be allowed.”). 
 266. See id. ¶ 3 (providing an exception for placement of matter for research purposes). 
 267.  See Resolution LC-LP.2 on the Assessment Framework for Scientific Research 
Involving Ocean Fertilization, I.M.O. Doc. LC 32/15/Annex 6 (Oct. 14, 2010) (adopting a 
framework to guide case-by-case assessment of research proposals). 
 268. See id. (determining what constitutes scientific research under the London 
Convention and Protocol); see also Assessment Framework for Scientific Research 
Involving Ocean Fertilization § 1, in Report of the Thirty-Second Consultative Meeting and 
the Fifth Meeting of Contracting Parties, I.M.O. Doc. LC 32/13/Annex 6 (Oct. 14, 2012) 
[hereinafter Assessment Framework] (providing a framework for assessing ocean 
fertilization research proposals).  
 269. See Assessment Framework, supra note 268, § 2 (detailing the initial assessment 
process). 
 270. See id. § 3 (discussing the environmental assessment process). 
 271. See id. §§ 1.3.2.6, 4.3 (explaining that risk management procedures are 
precautionary and that the decision to reject a proposal should take a precautionary approach 
into account). The precautionary principle presumably refers to that of the London Protocol: 
“it is important that States use the best practicable means to prevent such [marine] 
pollution.” London Protocol, supra note 260, pmbl. ¶ 5. 
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consult with stakeholders.272 If the project is approved, reports on the 
impacts during a field experiment are to be regularly sent to the Secretariat, 
and information from these reports can provide the basis to modify or to 
revoke the authorization as well as to improve future decision-making.273 
 The LC-LP decisions have already come under challenge.274 In 
2012, a private company conducted a large ocean fertilization experiment 
without the approval of its home state, Canada.275 The company’s 
representatives claimed that their intention was to increase salmon stocks 
on behalf of a Native American village, thus potentially avoiding the 
definition of ocean fertilization in the 2010 regulatory framework.276 After 
this work was revealed, the Canadian government announced an 
investigation into the ocean fertilization and the LC-LP Contracting Parties 
issued a statement deeming this project to be ocean fertilization.277 
                                                                                                                           
 272. See Resolution LC-LP.2 on the Assessment Framework for Scientific Research 
Involving Ocean Fertilization, supra note 268, § 1.8 (imposing consultation and notice 
requirements on stakeholders). 
 273. See id. §§ 5.1–5.2 (mandating s reports on the impacts of ocean fertilization for the 
Secretariat and noting that the information from these reports must inform and improve 
future decisionmaking). 
 274. See Craik et al., supra note 94, at 120–21 (discussing inter alia recent ocean 
fertilization activities which did not conform with LC-LP regulations). 
 275. See id. at 117–18 (summarizing the company’s activities and claims). 
 276. See id. (“The principals involved in the activity characterized it as an ocean 
‘restoration’ project, aimed at enhancing decreasing salmon stocks. However, they also 
made public statements indicating that they planned . . . to sell carbon credits on 
international markets for the carbon dioxide they assumed would be sequestered by the 
project.”). Stimulating primary production could be a means to achieve the goal of salmon 
restoration or carbon sequestration. The issue thus appears to be the precise meaning of 
“principle intention.” See id. at 122 (explaining that the principle intention of the experiment 
was to enhance salmon stocks). To further complicate matters, the president of the 
fertilization company, John Disney, claims that the boat was flying the village flag—
implying the absence of a Canadian flag—and that the experiment occurred beyond 200 
miles from shore (beyond Canada’s exclusive economic zone) but within the marine territory 
of the village, “which goes out to wherever they perceive the line to be based on where they 
sit now in the legal world, which is under aboriginal rights and title.” See West Coast Ocean 
Fertilization Project Defended, CBC NEWS (Oct. 19, 2012), 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/story/2012/10/19/bc-ocean-fertilization-haida.html 
(reporting the location of the experiment and that it was purportedly within the marine 
territory of a native village) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 277. See Company Behind Ocean Fertilization Experiment Loses Court Bid to Block 
Charges, THE CANADIAN PRESS (Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.cntvna.com/News/2014-
02/04/cms133257article.shtml (“The organization behind a controversial ocean fertilization 
experiment off the coast of British Columbia faces potentially 10 charges for environmental 
violations after losing a court bid that would have brought an end to the investigation [by the 
Canadian government].”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT); Report of the Thirty-Fourth Consultative Meeting of the 
Contracting Parties to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of 
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 In 2013, the Parties to the London Protocol (but not those to the 
London Convention) approved an amendment to the London Protocol, 
which, once accepted by two-thirds of the Parties, would implement a 
broader and binding regulatory framework.278 The amendment specifically 
defines “marine geoengineering,” which is not limited to ocean fertilization, 
scientific research, or a particular goal: 
 
“Marine geoengineering” means a deliberate intervention 
in the marine environment to manipulate natural processes, 
including to counteract anthropogenic climate change 
and/or its impacts, and that has the potential to result in 
deleterious effects, especially where those effects may be 
widespread, long lasting or severe.279 
 
The marine geoengineering activities listed in an accompanying proposed 
annex are either prohibited outright or would require a permit from a 
Party’s administrative government.280 For those activities which are listed 
and do require a permit, Parties are to follow a general assessment 
framework provided in a second proposed annex, as well as any other 
assessment mechanism developed by the Parties for a specific activity.281 
The general assessment framework for marine geoengineering activities 
calls for a detailed description of the proposed activity, notification of 
“potentially affected countries and relevant regional intergovernmental 
agreements and arrangements,” and a consultation plan.282 Parties are 
obligated to carry out a consultation process during the assessment phase, 
and “[c]onsent should be sought from all countries with jurisdiction or 
interests in the region of potential impact.”283 Both the Party responsible for 
                                                                                                                 
Wastes and Other Matter, 1972, and Seventh Meeting of Contracting Parties to the 1996 
Protocol thereto, Doc. LC 34/15, Nov. 23, 2012, Annex 3 (expressing “grave concern” at the 
ocean fertilization activity that took place in the Pacific Ocean off of the coast of Canada). 
 278. See Res. LP.4(8) on the Amendment to the London Protocol to Regulate the 
Placement of Matter for Ocean Fertilization and Other Marine Geoengineering Activities, 
Oct. 18, 2013, Rep. of the Thirty-Fifth Consultative Meeting and the Eighth Meeting of 
Contracting Parties, Doc. LC 35/15, Annex 4 (Oct. 21, 2013) (adopting an amendment to the 
London Protocol to regulate marine geoengineering). 
 279. Id. Annex 4, art.1. 
 280. See id. Annex 4 (stating that Parties shall not allow listed marine geoengineering 
activities unless the activity may be authorized by permit). 
 281. See id. Annex 5 (imposing requirements on assessment frameworks). 
 282. Id. Annex 5, ¶ 10 (“[P]otentially affected countries and relevant regional 
intergovernmental agreements and arrangements should be identified and notified and a plan 
should be developed for ongoing consultations on the potential impacts, and to encourage 
scientific cooperation.”). 
 283. Id. Annex 5, ¶ 11. 
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the regulation as well as any potentially affected countries should seek 
expert advice, including peer review.284 The ultimate assessment under the 
general framework is to be based on the site, the matter to be placed in the 
ocean, its expected effects, the proposed risk management, the means of 
monitoring, the financial resources available, consultation requirements, the 
environmental impact, and the expected benefits.285 Regarding the last two 
criteria, the framework implicitly acknowledges the climate change/climate 
engineering tension, in that it calls for “conditions [to be] in place to ensure 
that, as far as practicable, environmental disturbance and detriment would 
be minimized and the benefits maximized.”286 The proposed general 
assessment framework also details considerations which must be met in 
order for an activity to be “a specific marine scientific research activity,” a 
subset of the more general “marine geoengineering activities” category.287 
These requirements include: contributing to scientific knowledge, using 
appropriate methodology, being subject to peer review, a commitment to 
open publication of results, and a lack of personal economic interests.288 As 
it is presently proposed, ocean fertilization is the only marine 
geoengineering activity listed in the annex, which requires a permit and is 
limited only to legitimate scientific research.289 
 
I. Antarctic Treaty System 
 
 The Antarctic Treaty System governs relations among countries in 
the area beyond sixty degrees latitude south, where some of the proposed 
climate engineering methods, particularly ocean fertilization and SAI, could 
be researched.290 Relevant here is the Antarctic Treaty and its Madrid 
Protocol on Environmental Protection.291 Like UNCLOS, the Antarctic 
                                                                                                                           
 284. See id. Annex 5, ¶ 12 (stating that contracting Parties should consider advice for 
proposals from international experts, and that advice should include peer review as 
necessary). 
 285. See id. Annex 5, ¶¶ 8–9 (detailing information required for assessment of a 
proposal). 
 286. Id. Annex 5, ¶ 26.5. 
 287. Id. Annex 5, ¶¶ 7–9. 
 288. See id. Annex 5, ¶ 8 (listing considerations that must be applied to determine 
whether specific marine scientific research activity will be permitted). 
 289. See id. Annex 5, ¶ 1 (stating that an ocean fertilization activity will not be given a 
permit unless it constitutes legitimate scientific research). 
 290. See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 88, art. VI (stating that the provisions of the 
treaty cover the “area south of 60° South Latitude”). 
 291. See id. arts. II–III (promoting, among other things, cooperation in scientific 
investigation in Antarctica); Madrid Protocol, supra note 79, art. 3 (seeking to limit adverse 
environmental impacts on Antarctica and acknowledging that the continent presents 
opportunities for scientific discovery). Both the Antarctic Treaty and the Madrid Protocol 
have been adopted by all countries with Antarctic activity. Id. 
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Treaty system calls for both environmental protection and scientific 
research.292 In particular, the brief Treaty establishes a “freedom of 
scientific investigation,” within which Parties are to cooperate and share 
information.293 It also calls for the Parties to meet to discuss and further the 
facilitation of scientific research, as well as the “preservation and 
conservation of living resources.”294 The Madrid Protocol is more detailed 
about both environmental protection and scientific research.295 Generally 
speaking, it promotes both, often simultaneously.296 For example, the 
objective of the Parties is to protect the Antarctic environment and to 
designate the area as “a natural reserve, devoted to peace and science.”297 
Similarly, the agreement’s first principle is that both environmental 
protection and Antarctica’s “value as an area for the conduct of scientific 
research, in particular research essential to understanding the global 
environment, shall be fundamental considerations in the planning and 
conduct of all activities.”298 One principle states that “[a]ctivities shall be 
planned and conducted so as to accord priority to scientific 
research . . . including research essential to understanding the global 
environment,”299 while the following principle states that activities shall be 
“modified, suspended or cancelled if they result in or threaten to result in 
impacts upon the Antarctic environment.”300 
 The Madrid Protocol and its Annexes impose obligations on its 
Parties that could apply in the context of climate engineering field research. 
All activities must be for peaceful purposes.301 Further, the climate 
                                                                                                                           
 292. See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 88, art. IX.1 (explaining that among the 
objectives of the treaty are facilitation of scientific research and preservation of resources in 
Antarctica). Interestingly, “scientific research” is left undefined. 
 293. See id. arts. II (“Freedom of scientific investigation in Antartica and cooperation 
toward that end . . . shall continue . . . .”). 
 294. See id. art. IX.1 (stating that the Parties shall meet and consult with each other 
regarding measures which can help to use Antarctica for peaceful purposes, to facilitate 
scientific research, and to preserve living resources). 
 295. See Madrid Protocol, supra note 80, art. 3 (describing the activities that must be 
planned to limit adverse impacts to the Antarctic environment, giving a list of adverse 
effects to avoid, and also explaining that the value of scientific research will be considered 
and weighed based on a comprehensive list of factors). 
 296. Notably, earlier drafts placed a greater emphasis on scientific research, with 
environmental protection as a means to ensure that this goal remained possible. See W.M. 
BUSH, ANTARCTICA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A COLLECTION OF INTER-STATE AND 
NATIONAL DOCUMENTS 5–7 (1991) (discussing prior drafts of the Antarctic Treaty). 
 297. See Madrid Protocol, supra note 79, art. 2 (describing the treaty’s objective as 
twofold: protecting the environment and devoting Antarctica to peace and science). 
 298. Id. art. 3.1. 
 299. Id. art. 3.2. 
 300. Id. art. 3.4(b). “Adverse impacts” and “impacts” are not further defined. 
 301. See id. art. 2 (“The Parties . . . hereby designate Antartica as a natural reserve, 
devoted to peace and science.”). 
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change/climate engineering tension is clear when the protocol states that, 
“activities in the Antarctic Treaty area shall be planned and conducted so as 
to limit adverse impacts on the Antarctic environment and . . . to avoid: (i) 
adverse effects on climate or weather patterns; . . . [and] (iii) significant 
changes in the atmospheric, terrestrial (including aquatic), glacial or marine 
environments.”302 Both climate change and climate engineering will cause 
“significant changes” in the atmosphere and environment.303 Moreover, the 
former, and perhaps the latter, will cause “adverse effects” on the earth’s 
climate.304 Climate engineering’s effects, however, and certainly those from 
its research, are expected to be less severe.305 Additionally, climate 
engineering is intended to avoid the adverse effects from climate change.306 
Other relevant commitments include environmental impact assessment, 
cooperation, monitoring, and reporting.307 Notably, scientific activities are 
explicitly subject to impact assessment, and the only climate engineering 
assessment, to date, supported ocean fertilization research.308 
 Two particular provisions in the Annexes could present barriers to 
climate engineering research. First, if an activity “results in the significant 
adverse modification of habitat,” it would require a permit from the state’s 
“appropriate authority.”309 Second, ocean fertilization in Antarctic waters 
could be considered “discharge into the sea of . . . any other chemical or 
other substances, in quantities or concentrations that are harmful to the 
marine environment,” and thus prohibited.310 The wording in both cases, 
                                                                                                                           
 302. Id. art. 3.2(b). 
 303. See supra Parts I, II (outlining the consequences of climate change engineering). 
 304. See supra Part II (describing climate engineering methods). 
 305. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (comparing the relative impacts of 
climate change and engineering). 
 306. See supra Part II. 
 307. See Madrid Protocol, supra note 79, arts. 3.2, 6, 8, 17 (imposing on the Parties 
obligations to cooperate in the planning and conduct of activities in the Antarctic, to 
complete environmental evaluations, to monitor environmental indicators, and to circulate 
information to other Parties). 
 308. See id. art. 6 (requiring environmental impact assessments); Karen N. Scott, 
Scientific Rhetoric and Antarctic Security, in ANTARCTIC SECURITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 284 (Alan D. Hemmings et al. eds., 2012) (citing the assessed and approved 
project by the New Zealand National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research). 
Simultaneously, assessments of any activity “likely to have more than a minor or transitory 
impact” must consider its effects on the conduct of scientific research. See Madrid Protocol, 
supra note 79, Annex I, art. 3.2 (requiring this consideration). 
 309. See Madrid Protocol, supra note 79, Annex II, arts. 1, 3 (defining “harmful 
interference” to include significant adverse modification of habitats, and precluding 
“harmful interference” except when allowed by permit). A permit is also required for 
research activities in “Specially Protected or Managed Areas.” See id. Annex V, art. 4 
(establishing when a Party seeking to conduct scientific research is required to have a 
permit). 
 310. Id. Annex IV, art. 4. 
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however, requires that the environmental damage be certain and not merely 
speculative.311 Field experiments, and particularly those of initially small 
scales, would be unlikely, or at least uncertain, to have such effects.312 In 
addition, ships operated by governments on a noncommercial basis are 
exempt from the latter provision.313 
 
J. Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-
East Atlantic 
 
 The Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of 
the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR Convention) is a regional marine MEA 
that is important because of the governed regions’ proximity to, and the 
participation of, countries that are leaders in climate engineering research, 
such as the United Kingdom and Germany.314 The OSPAR Convention 
regulates activities that may impact the environment of the northeast 
Atlantic Ocean, including the North Sea and part of the Arctic Sea.315 Under 
this convention, “pollution” is defined in much the same way as in the LC-
LP, the LRTAP Convention, and UNCLOS.316 Thus greenhouse gases and, 
arguably, global warming are included in the definition of pollution. As a 
consequence, the climate change/climate engineering tension is brought to 
the fore by the OSPAR Convention’s most relevant provision, which 
requires Parties to “take all possible steps to prevent and eliminate pollution 
and shall take the necessary measures to protect the maritime area against 
the adverse effects of human activities so as to safeguard human health and 
to conserve marine ecosystems and, when practicable, restore marine areas 
which have been adversely affected.”317 The final reference to restoration 
                                                                                                                           
 311. See id. at (defining “harmful interference” to include only particular activities and 
only prohibiting the discharge of noxious substances as defined specifically in Annex II or 
that are harmful to marine environment). 
 312. See generally Parson & Keith, supra note 56, at 1279 (arguing that the 
environmental impact of field experiments would be limited). 
 313. See Madrid Protocol, supra note 79, Annex IV, art. 11 (stating that Annex IV of 
the Protocol does not apply to ships owned or operated by a State and operated only for non-
commercial service). 
 314. See generally OSPAR Convention, supra note 75 (demonstrating that both 
countries are signatories of the Convention); Parker & Keith, supra note 128 (discussing the 
leaders of climate engineering research). 
 315. See OSPAR Convention, supra note 75, art. I (explaining that “maritime area” 
under the treaty generally includes the Atlantic and Arctic Ocean north of thirty-six degrees 
north latitude). 
 316. See id. (defining “pollution” to include introductions of substances or energy into 
the maritime area that results in hazards to health, harm to the environment, or other 
damage). 
 317. Id. art. 2.1(a). 
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endorses the general concept of human interventions in the natural 
environment in order to mitigate prior adverse effects. 
 A handful of other articles in the OSPAR Convention also shape its 
relation to climate engineering field research. First, scientific research 
(which remains undefined) is encouraged in order to “further the aims of 
the Convention,” potentially lending some weight to climate engineering 
experiments.318 Second, Parties are to apply both the precautionary 
principle and the polluter pays principle.319 Although the former favors 
climate engineering research in the context of the UNFCCC, this would not 
be the case here, as it calls only for “preventive measures” in the face of 
uncertain risks.320 Instead, this formulation of the precautionanry principle 
would argue for proceeding with great caution—if at all—if a proposed 
climate engineering field test were to pose a significant environmental 
risk.321 In contrast, the polluter pays principle would support the research of 
climate engineering because the work is presently funded by those States 
that have contributed more to historical greenhouse gas emissions.322 Third, 
in an article reminiscent of one in UNCLOS, Parties must carry out their 
obligations in a manner that does not transfer pollution to the sea outside of 
the covered area, or to another part of the environment.323 This would rule 
out large-scale field research if early research indicated that further action 
would protect the OSPAR area while polluting other areas. Fourth, in the 
event of transboundary pollution, which could occur with climate 
engineering field tests, Parties commit to consult one another in order to try 
to reach an agreement, and either Party can seek the advice of the OSPAR 
Convention’s governing Commission.324 Finally, Parties that are 
responsible for climate engineering research would be subject to procedural 
                                                                                                                           
 318. See id. art. 8 (stating that the Parties must establish programs of scientific or 
technical research and report the results of that research). 
 319. See id. art. 2.2 (requiring the Parties to apply these principles in assessing state 
conduct). 
 320. See id. (“[P]reventive measures are to be taken when there are reasonable grounds 
for concern that substances or energy introduced, directly or indirectly, into the marine 
environment may bring about hazards to human health, harm living resources and marine 
ecosystems, . . . even when there is no conclusive evidence of a causal relationship . . . .”). 
 321. See Reynolds & Fleurke, supra note 132, at 104–05  (introducing and defining the 
precautionary principle). 
 322. See generally Parker & Keith, supra note 128 (documenting public funding of 
climate engineering projects). Climate engineering research is presently led by Germany, the 
United Kingdom, the European Union, and the United States, all of which are near the top of 
historic greenhouse gas emissions. Id.     
 323. See id. art. 2.4 (“The Contracting Parties shall apply the measures they adopt in 
such a way as to prevent an increase in pollution of the sea outside the maritime area or in 
other parts of the environment.”). 
 324. See id. art. 21 (agreeing to enter into a consultation with any concerned state and 
stating that any party may seek the advice of the Commission). 
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obligations including environmental monitoring, reporting, and providing 
public access to the relevant information.325 
 Ocean fertilization under the OSPAR Convention warrants some 
final attention. Dumping, which is defined similarly to the definition in 
UNCLOS and the LC-LP, is generally prohibited except in a handful of 
circumstances.326 As witnessed under the LC-LP, whether ocean 
fertilization and its research are dumping under this definition is unclear.327 
Most OSPAR Convention Parties are also participants in the LC-LP (and in 
the London Protocol specifically) and would likely defer to the detailed 
rules of the latter.328 Furthermore, the Commission has passed a “Code of 
Conduct for Responsible Marine Research,” which, although not binding, 
dissuades scientists from changing populations or marine habitats.329 
Regardless, this is not especially relevant, as the North Atlantic is less 
suitable for ocean fertilization.330 
 
K. Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary 
Context 
 
 The Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a 
Transboundary Context (the Espoo Convention)331 was developed through 
the UNECE in order to clarify and expand States’ commitments to assess 
potential transboundary environmental impacts, to share those assessments 
with the public and other States, and to reduce significant environmental 
transboundary effects.332 The Espoo Convention should improve 
                                                                                                                           
 325. See id. art. 6 (discussing environmental monitoring); id. art. 9 (discussing public 
access to information); id. art. 22 (discussing reporting requirements).  
 326. See id. arts. 1, 4, Annex II (defining and regulating dumping). 
 327.  See supra Part IV.H (discussing the LC-LP).  
 328.  Compare OSPAR Convention—Contracting Parties, OSPAR COMISSION, 
http://www.ospar.org/content/content.asp?menu=01481200000026_000000_000000 (last 
visited May 22, 2014) (listing the signatories to the Ospar Convention), with Office for the 
London Convention and Protocol, supra note 261 (listing the signatories to the London 
Convention and Protocol). 
 329. See OSPAR Code of Conduct for Responsible Marine Research in the Deep Seas 
and High Seas of the OSPAR Maritime Area, Annex 6, ¶¶ 12–13, 2008, OSPAR Doc, 
08/24/1 (stating that responsible marine science includes a responsibility to avoid long-term 
changes or any damage to species or habitats). 
 330. See Williamson et al., supra note 33, at 477 (stating that the Southern Ocean is the 
area with the greatest potential for ocean fertilization because iron is the limiting nutrient 
there). 
 331. Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, 
Feb. 25, 1991, 1989 U.N.T.S. 309 [hereinafter Espoo Convention].  
 332. See generally id. (committing to “take all appropriate and effective measures to 
prevent, reduce and control significant adverse transboundary environmental impact”). Most 
industrialized nations, except for Russia and the United States, have joined the Espoo 
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transparency, public participation, and international cooperation in the lead-
up to large-scale climate engineering field trials. Its definitions of “impact” 
and “transboundary impact,” as well as its criteria for a significant proposed 
activity, are each clearly broad enough to include large-scale climate 
engineering field trials.333 Greenhouse gas emissions and climate change are 
not be covered, however, as the agreement applies only to “proposed 
activities” that are “subject to a decision of a competent authority in 
accordance with an applicable national procedure.”334 Note that the Espoo 
Convention only applies to potential transboundary environmental impacts 
between two Parties to the Convention, and not to effects that are intrastate, 
occur in nonstate areas, or occur in a non-party state.335 
 The Espoo Convention requires Parties to “take all appropriate and 
effective measures to prevent, reduce and control significant adverse 
transboundary environmental impact from proposed activities.”336 Thus, the 
government of any Party that is considering approval of such a field trial 
that may impact another Party would be subject to a number of procedural 
obligations, most of which should be fulfilled before the activity is 
approved.337 Chief among these is the duty to notify potentially affected 
Parties and, if those countries agree, to undertake an environmental impact 
assessment in such a manner as to permit participation by the public living 
in the area likely to be affected, including the public of the other affected 
countries.338 The origin Party and the concerned party are then required to 
consult each other on the proposed project.339 When making the final 
decision to approve the proposed activities, the origin Party is to take into 
account the impact assessment, public comments, and the consultation with 
the concerned Party.340 The Espoo Convention also calls for post-project 
                                                                                                                 
Convention. See Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary 
Context Status, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION (May 4, 2014 7:04 PM), 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_ no=XXVII-
4&chapter=27&lang=en (providing a list of the signatories to the Espoo Convention) (on file 
with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).  
 333. See id. art. 1 (defining “impact” and “transboundary”); see id. app. III (providing 
criteria for activities not listed in Appendix 1 that potentially qualify as significant for 
purposes of the agreement). 
 334. Id. art. 1(v). 
 335. See id. art. 1(viii) (noting that, under the Convention, “transboundary impact” is 
limited to impact within the jurisdiction of a signatory). 
 336. Id. art. 2.1. 
 337. See id. art. 3 (explaining a Party’s obligation to notify other Parties of potential 
environmental impacts).  
 338. See id. art. 2 (detailing the procedures necessary for an impact assessment). 
 339. See id. art. 5 (imposing requirements on consultation and impact assessment). 
 340. See id. art. 6(1) (“The Parties shall ensure that, in the final decision . . . due 
account is taken of the outcome of the environmental impact assessment, including 
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analysis, and if there are “reasonable grounds for concluding that there is a 
significant adverse transboundary impact . . . concerned Parties shall then 
consult on necessary measures to reduce or eliminate the impact.”341 
 
L. Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters 
 
 Like the Espoo Convention, the Convention on Access to 
Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice 
in Environmental Matters (the Aarhus Convention)342 is an MEA developed 
within the UNECE in order to improve the disclosure of information and 
access to decision-making for actions that may have an environmental 
impact.343 It would commit Parties to carry out several procedural duties in 
the event of large-scale climate engineering field tests.344 In general, “each 
Party shall guarantee the rights of access to information, public 
participation in decision-making, and access to justice in environmental 
matters.”345 Notably, these matters need not be transboundary, and the 
Espoo Convention consequently establishes these rights for individuals and 
NGOs with respect to their own governments.346 Furthermore, these rights 
apply even in the absence of present or potential harm.347 The Convention 
details standards for the collection and provision of relevant information, 
which is broadly defined.348 Although the original Aarhus Convention 
                                                                                                                 
the . . . documentation, as well as the comments thereon received . . . and the outcome of the 
consultations . . . .”).  
 341. Id. art. 7. 
 342. Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making 
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, 2161 U.N.T.S. 447 
[hereinafter Aarhus Convention].  
 343. See generally id. (recognizing that public access to information is important for 
environmental protection). The UNECE countries that are not a party to the Aarhus 
convention include the United States, Canada, and Russia. See Convention on Access to 
Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters Status, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION (May 4, 2014 6:57 
PM), https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no= XXVII-
13&chapter=27&lang=en (providing a list of the signatories to the Aarhus Convention) (on 
file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).  
 344.  See generally Aarhus Convention supra note 342 (establishing requirements on 
signatories prior to taking actions that may affect the environment). 
 345. Id. art. 1. 
 346. See id. pmbl. (“Recognizing further the importance of the respective roles that 
individual citizens, non-governmental organizations and the private sector can play in 
environmental protection.”). 
 347. See id. arts. 3–5 (listing the obligations of parties under the Aarhus Convention). 
 348. See id. art. 2.3 (defining “environmental information” to include “activities or 
measures, including administrative measures, environmental agreements, policies, 
legislation, plans and programmes, affecting or likely to affect the elements of the 
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obligates Parties to merely “encourage [private] operators whose activities 
have a significant impact on the environment to inform the public regularly 
of the environmental impact of their activities and products,”349 its Kiev 
Protocol on Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers expands this into an 
obligation for private actors to collect and publish relevant data.350 The 
right for participation is somewhat similar to the process of environmental 
impact assessment in the Espoo Convention,351 and is limited to those 
members of the broad “public concerned.”352 The provision in the Aarhus 
Convention for access to justice establishes minimum standards of redress 
for members of the public with sufficient interests in any environmental 
laws that have been violated.353 
 
V. Nonbinding Multilateral Environmental Agreements 
 
 This section analyzes four nonbinding international agreements that 
may shape how climate engineering research will be regulated. Although 
nonbinding, they constitute a key component of international soft law and 
provide a sense of where the international community stands. 
 
A. Provisions for Co-operation Between States in Weather Modification 
 
 In 1980, partially in response to the passage of ENMOD, the 
leadership of the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP) drafted and 
                                                                                                                 
environment . . . , and cost-benefit and other economic analyses and assumptions used in 
environmental decision-making”); id. arts. 4–5 (explaining the procedure for collecting 
environmental information and detailing the required access to, and dissemination of, such 
information). 
 349. Id. art. 5.6.  
 350.  See Protocol on Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers to the Convention on 
Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters, May 21, 2003, 005/2010 U.K.T.S. Cm. 7879 (mandating that each 
operator impacting the environment regularly inform the public of the environmental impact 
and any voluntary auditing schemes).  
 351. Compare Aarhus Convention, supra note 342, art. 6.7 (“Procedures for public 
participation shall allow the public to submit, in writing or, as appropriate, at a public 
hearing or inquiry with the applicant, any comments, information, analyses or opinions that 
it considers relevant to the proposed activity.”), with Espoo Convention, supra note 331, art. 
2.2 (providing for public participation).    
 352. See Aarhus Convention, supra note 342, art. 2.5v (“‘The public concerned’ means 
the public affected or likely to be affected by, or having an interest in, the environmental 
decision-making; for the purposes of this definition, non-governmental organizations 
promoting environmental protection and meeting any requirements under national law shall 
be deemed to have an interest.”). 
 353. See id. art. 9 (establishing that a Party seeking redress must either have a 
“sufficient interest” or maintain that a right has been impaired). 
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approved Provisions for Co-operation between States in Weather 
Modification.354 Although weather and climate are scientifically distinct, 
the Provisions define “weather modification” to include climate 
interventions, and this is thus a particularly important nonbinding legal 
document.355 In general, the document provides qualified support for 
weather modification while calling for procedural duties to be imposed on 
the States under whose authority these activities may take place. For 
example, it notes “the possible benefits which weather modification may 
hold for mankind and the environment”356 and asserts that “[w]eather 
modification should be dedicated to the benefit of mankind and the 
environment.”357 The Provisions further call for “[e]xchange of information, 
notification, consultation and other forms of co-operation.”358 For potential 
transboundary impacts from weather modification, this provision 
recommends environmental impact assessments and efforts “to ensure that 
[weather modification activities] do not cause damage to the environment 
of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”359 
 
B. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment 
 
 Modern international environmental law can be traced to the 1972 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment and its Declaration 
(the Stockholm Declaration).360 To the extent that it still conveys the 
priorities of contemporary international environmental law, it lends support 
to climate engineering field research, provided that such activity is done in 
a manner that minimizes transboundary harm.361 The Stockholm 
Declaration is a thoroughly anthropocentric document, emphasizing 
                                                                                                                           
 354. See generally Provisions for Co-operation between States in Weather 
Modification, U.N.E.P. Dec. 8/7/A, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC/8/7/A (Apr. 29, 1980) (setting out 
States’ obligations to each other with respect to weather modification). 
 355. See id. pt. 1(b) (“[A]ny action performed with the intention of producing artificial 
changes in the properties of the atmosphere for purposes such as increasing, decreasing or 
redistributing precipitation or cloud coverage, moderating severe storms and tropical 
cyclones, decreasing or suppressing hail or lightning or dissipating fog.”). 
 356. Id. cl. 5. 
 357. Id. pt. 1(a). 
 358. See id. pt. 1(b) (explaining that these further provisions should be carried out in 
good faith and without delay). 
 359. Id. pt. 1(f). 
 360. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 
adopted June 16, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 1416 [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].  
 361. See id. ¶¶ 6–7 (stating that “through fuller knowledge and wiser action, we can 
achieve for ourselves and our posterity . . . an environment more in keeping with human 
needs” but that to “achieve this environmental goal will demand the acceptance of 
responsibility . . . at every level, all sharing equitably in common efforts”). 
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humans’ responsibility to “manage” the “human environment” in order to 
“protect and improve” it.362 For example, it proclaims that “man [sic] must 
use knowledge to build, in collaboration with nature, a better 
environment.”363 Additionally, its first principle is that “he [sic] bears a 
solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present 
and future generations.”364 The focus on “human environment” further 
implies a prioritization of the environment as it relates to the well being of 
people, and that preservation of the natural environment for its own sake is 
secondary.365 Furthermore, the Stockholm Declaration calls for science and 
technology to be “applied to the identification, avoidance and control of 
environmental risks and the solution of environmental problems and for the 
common good of mankind”366 and for “the free flow of up-to-date scientific 
information and transfer of experience.”367 It also explicates principles for 
the minimization and reduction of transboundary harm,368 for the 
development of liability for transboundary harm,369 and for international 
cooperation in protecting and improving the environment.370 
 
C. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
 
 Twenty years later, representatives of most countries agreed upon 
the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (Rio Declaration).371 
Although it retains a somewhat anthropocentric focus, almost entirely 
absent are the calls to manage and improve the Earth.372 Instead, it focuses 
                                                                                                                           
 362. See generally id. (outlining the “special responsibility to safeguard and wisely 
manage the heritage of wildlife and its habitat”).  
 363. Id. ¶ 6. 
 364. Id. princ. 1. 
 365. See Dinah Shelton, Human Rights, Environmental Rights, and the Right to 
Environment, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 103, 108 (1991) (“The 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the 
Human Environment suggests that human benefit is the primary reason for respecting the 
environment . . . .”). 
 366. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 360, princ. 18. 
 367. Id. princ. 20. 
 368. See id. princ. 21 (“States have . . . the responsibility to ensure that activities within 
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of 
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”). 
 369. See id. princ. 22 (“States shall cooperate to develop further the international law 
regarding liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and other environmental 
damage caused by activities within the jurisdiction or control of such States to areas beyond 
their jurisdiction.”). 
 370. See id. princ. 24 (stating that international efforts to protect and improve the 
environment “should be handled in a cooperative spirit by all countries”). 
 371. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, adopted June 14, 1992, 31 
I.L.M. 874 [hereinafter Rio Declaration]. 
 372. See id. at princ. 1 (“Human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable 
development . . . .”). 
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on the interrelation between environmental protection and the needs of the 
world’s poor.373 Some of the principles of the Rio Declaration, however, 
could be interpreted as favoring climate engineering research. For example, 
it calls for “improving scientific understanding” and for developing “new 
and innovative technologies.”374 Furthermore, because the research would 
largely be financed by industrialized countries, the Rio Declaration’s 
discussion of “common but differentiated responsibilities” and of the 
“internalization of environmental costs” appear supportive of climate 
engineering research.375 The Rio Declaration also invokes precaution: 
“[w]here there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”376 Given that the 
threats of climate change appear to be more serious and irreversible than 
those of climate engineering,377 and that the latter is expected to have low 
financial costs,378 the Rio Declaration—like the UNFCCC—appears to 
argue for climate engineering research.379 On the other hand, another 
principle states that countries should “discourage or prevent the relocation 
and transfer to other States of any activities and substances that cause 
severe environmental degradation or are found to be harmful to human 
health.”380 If field trials were to somehow put one human population at 
particular risk, this Principle may be violated.381 Finally, some of the 
principles call for procedural obligations on the part of countries that may 
approve climate engineering field trials.382 Perhaps most importantly, such 
                                                                                                                           
 373. See id. princ. 6 (stating that those countries “least developed and those most 
environmentally vulnerable” are to be “given special priority”). 
 374. See id. princ. 9 (“States should cooperate to . . . improv[e] scientific understanding 
through exchanges of scientific and technological knowledge, and . . . enhance[e] the 
development, adaptation, diffusion and transfer of technologies, including new and 
innovative technologies.”). 
 375. See id. princ. 7 (“States have common but differentiated responsibilities.”); id. at 
princ. 16 (“National authorities should endeavour to promote the internalization of 
environmental costs.”). 
 376. Id. princ. 15. 
 377. See supra note 65 (comparing the effects of climate change with the more limited 
effects of climate engineering).  
 378. See supra note 121 and accompanying text (discussing the relative low cost of 
climate engineering). 
 379. See supra notes 130–132 and accompanying text (discussing the UNFCCC’s 
support for cost-effective climate engineering research). 
 380. Rio Declaration, supra note 371, at princ. 14. 
 381. See id. princ. 14 (“States should effectively cooperate to discourage or prevent the 
relocation and transfer to other States of any activities and substances that cause severe 
environmental degradation or are found to be harmful to human health.”). 
 382. See id. princ. 17 (requiring States to prepare environmental impact assessments); 
id. princ. 19 (“States shall provide prior and timely notification and relevant information to 
potentially affected states . . . .”). 
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steps “should, as far as possible, be based on an international consensus.”383 
The governments of these countries should also conduct environmental 
impact assessments,384 notify affected States,385 and provide public access 
to relevant information.386 
 
D. UN General Assembly 
 
 Finally, the UN General Assembly approved a 2007 resolution that, 
among other things, “encourages States to support the further study and 
enhance understanding of ocean iron fertilization.”387 
 
VI. Customary International Law 
 
 Customary international law concerning transboundary harm will 
also apply to climate engineering field research. The customary law 





 The customary international law of preventing potential 
transboundary environmental impacts is among the oldest and most-
established components of international environmental law. 388 States’ 
commitments in this regard are to “prevent, reduce, and control 
transboundary pollution and environmental harm resulting from activities 
within their jurisdiction or control . . . [and] to cooperate in mitigating 
transboundary environmental risks and emergencies, th[r]ough notification, 
consultation, negotiation, and in appropriate cases, environmental impact 
assessment.”389 Such customary law has developed through court cases and 
                                                                                                                           
 383. Id. princ. 12. 
 384. See id. princ. 17 (calling on States to make environmental impact assessments 
when their activities “are likely to have a significant adverse impact on the 
environment . . . .”). 
 385. See id. princ. 19 (listing the instances that States need to notify one another of 
potential environmental impacts). 
 386. See id. princ. 10 (“States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and 
participation by making information widely available.”). 
 387. G.A. Res. 62/215, ¶ 98, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/215 (Dec. 22, 2007). 
 388. See DANIEL BODANSKY, THE ART AND CRAFT OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW 198 (2010) (noting that the “duty to prevent transboundary pollution” is seen as the 
“most firmly established customary norm” of international environmental law). 
 389. BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 68, at 137. 
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state practice.390 Using the International Law Commission (ILC) Draft 
Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous 
Activities391 as a guide, some forms of large-scale climate engineering field 
research could pose a “significant risk of causing significant transboundary 
harm.”392 Although not defined in the articles, the accompanying 
commentary clarifies this phrase as being objectively and reasonably 
foreseeable, with the potential harm as being “more than detectable but 
need not be at the level of ‘serious’ or ‘substantial.’ The harm must lead to 
a real detrimental effect on matters such as, for example, human health, 
industry, property, environment or agriculture in other states.”393 If climate 
engineering field research were to be undertaken, then the origin State’s 
duties would include implementing “all appropriate measures to prevent” 
the harm,394 requiring authorization for a domestic party to conduct the 
activity in question,395 performing an environmental impact assessment,396 
notifying States likely to be affected,397 informing the public likely to be 
affected,398 and developing contingency plans to prepare for an 
emergency.399 The precise steps to prevent and minimize the harm are 
subject to consultations between the countries,400 and are to be “based on an 
equitable balance of interests,”401 whose relevant factors for consideration 
include: 
 
                                                                                                                           
 390. See id. at 138 (explaining that the duty to prevent potential transboundary harm is 
evidenced by treaties, state action, and case law). 
 391. 53 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, art. 2(a), UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in 
[2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 146 U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2) 
[hereinafter Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm].  
 392. See id. art. 1 (“Any activity which involves the risk of causing significant 
transboundary harm through the physical consequences is within the scope of the articles.”); 
id. art. 1 cmt. 14 (“The mere fact that harm eventually results from an activity does not mean 
that the activity involved a risk, if no properly informed observer was or could have been 
aware of that risk at the time the activity was carried out.”).  
 393. Id. art. 2 cmt. 4. 
 394. See id. art. 3 (“The State of origin shall take all appropriate measures to prevent 
significant transboundary harm or at any event to minimize the risk thereof.”). 
 395. See id. art. 6 (listing the circumstances under which a State may require prior 
authorization before a party can act). 
 396. See id. art. 7 (requiring States to consider any environmental impact assessment 
when authorizing certain activities). 
 397. See id. art. 8 (requiring States to notify other States likely to be affected if the 
assessment required in art. 7 “indicates a risk of causing significant transboundary harm”). 
 398. See id. art. 13 (requiring States to inform the public likely to be affected). 
 399. See id. art. 16 (“The State of origin shall develop contingency plans for responding 
to emergencies.”). 
 400. See id. art. 9 ¶ 1 (stating that “[t]he states concerned shall enter into 
consultations”). 
 401. Id. art. 9 ¶ 2. 
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the importance of the activity, taking into account its 
overall advantages of a social, economic and technical 
character for the State of origin in relation to the potential 
harm for the State likely to be affected; . . . [and] the 
economic viability of the activity in relation to the costs of 
prevention and to the possibility of carrying out the activity 
elsewhere or by other means or replacing it with an 
alternative activity . . . .402 
 
These two phrases again pose the climate change/climate engineering 
tension. The “equitable balance of interests” creates a significant burden for 
the potentially affected country to argue for strong preventative measures, 
particularly if the state of origin were to face high climate change damages 
and high costs to mitigate these damages.403 An alternate interpretation of 
these factors, however, could be that climate engineering field research 
does not present concentrated economic benefits to the country performing 
it.404 Instead, its benefits would be diffused throughout the world, whereas 
the risks may be limited to a small number of countries.405 Ultimately, how 
a court may rule would depend on the particular context406 and the extent to 
which the state of risk origin had acted with due diligence.407 
 The second half of the customary law of prevention is for countries 
to cooperate to mitigate risks.408 Specific duties herein include notification, 
consultation, and negotiation.409 For example, according to the Rio 
Declaration, the notification should be “prior and timely” and consist of 
“relevant information.”410 Consultations should occur “at an early stage and 
                                                                                                                           
 402. Id. art. 10(b), (e). 
 403. See supra note 121 and accompanying text (discussing the costs of SRM climate 
engineering research). 
 404. See id. at 103 (discussing the potential benefits of SRM climate engineering 
research). 
 405. See id. at 103–04 (arguing that deploying SRM has a “reasonable chance” of 
“significantly reduc[ing] the net damage from climate change to humans and the 
environment,” and its smaller costs would be considered insurance). 
 406. See Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm, supra note 392, art. 10 
(stating factors to consider in the “equitable balance of interests” required in article 9). 
 407. See id. art. 3 cmts. 7–8 (defining due diligence and explaining its prevalence in the 
“protection of the environment from harm”). 
 408. See BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 68, at 137 (listing theStates that have a duty to 
“cooperate in mitigating transboundary environmental risks and emergencies”). 
 409. See id. (requiring States to mitigate risks through “notification, consultation, 
negotiation, and in appropriate cases, environmental impact assessment”). 
 410. See Rio Declaration, supra note 371, princ. 19 (describing requirements of notice 
and consultation). 
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in good faith.”411 Most States under whose jurisdiction or control climate 
engineering field trials would occur would require an environmental impact 
assessment under domestic law, even in the absence of transboundary 
risks.412 If they were to occur in areas beyond national jurisdiction, then 
MEAs including UNCLOS and the Antarctica Treaty system would 
apply.413 If the proposal raised the prospect of transboundary impacts, then 
the Espoo Convention, customary international law, and many national 
laws would call for assessments.414 Regardless, the details of impact 
assessments are often more contentious than whether an assessment is 
required.415 In a domain as novel as climate engineering field 
experimentation, uncertainty may prevail, and both a judicious 
interpretation of the precautionary principle as well as political wisdom 
calls for erring on the side of a more thorough assessment.416 There are, 
however, limited exceptions, as not every country has an assessment law or 
is a party to the Espoo Convention.417 Furthermore, customary law, which 
requires assessment, does not apply to effects completely within national 
boundaries or to global impacts.418 
 
B. Responsibility and Liability 
 
 The international law on ex post responsibility and liability for 
transboundary damage remains less developed than the law regarding its 
                                                                                                                           
 411. See id. (discussing the obligations between nations when conducting experiments 
that affect the environment). 
 412. See BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 68, at 165 (“An [environmental impact assessment] 
is fundamental to any regulatory system which seeks to identify environmental risk, 
integrate environmental concerns into development projects and promote sustainable 
development.”). 
 413. See SANDS & PEEL, supra note 74, at 605–08 (discussing when an environmental 
assessment is required under a variety of international treaties covering the environment). 
 414. See id. at 605, 611 (discussing the use of environmental impact assessments in the 
context of customary law and the Espoo Convention). 
 415. See id. at 602 (noting that while it is generally understood when environmental 
impact assessments need to be made, there is much less consensus as to what should be 
included in the assessments). 
 416. See BETZ AT AL., supra note 240, at 99 (suggesting that environmental impact 
assessments should be more thorough for climate engineering because there is a greater risk 
of hazard with climate engineering) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF 
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 417. See SANDS & PEEL, supra note 74, at 601 (noting that environmental impact 
assessments “have been progressively adopted in a very large number of legal systems,” 
suggesting that not all legal systems require assessments); id. at 610 (noting that the Espoo 
Convention only commits Parties who signed the Convention). 
 418. See BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 68, at 167 (“[A]t present general international law 
neither requires states to assess possible global effects for effects wholly within their own 
borders.”). 
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prevention.419 For example, the only MEAs examined here that establish 
liability are the Space Liability Convention420 and UNCLOS.421 Under 
customary international law, if the state that is the source of damage 
violated international law, including noncompliance with the customary 
international law of preventing transboundary harm, it should cease the 
activity, assure that the act will not recur, and make reparations for the 
injuries.422 In the absence of a violation, climate engineering field studies—
certainly at larger scales—likely qualify as ultra-hazardous activities,423 for 
which there is often absolute or strict liability.424 Although, such absolute or 
strict liability could, in theory, be considered a part of customary 
international law due to its presence in national and international laws and 
for a handful of specific activities, there is not yet adequate state practice 
for this to be the case.425 The draft ILC principles for Transboundary 
                                                                                                                           
 419. See id. at 303 (acknowledging an “absence of clarity concerning remedies 
available to states and their scope”). 
 420. See Space Liability Convention, supra note 217 and accompanying text. 
 421. See UNCLOS supra note 247 and accompanying text. An Annex to the Madrid 
Protocol for liability in the Antarctic is not yet in force. See The Protocol on Environmental 
Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, SECRETARIAT OF THE ANTARCTIC TREATY, 
http://www.ats.aq/e/ep.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2014) (“Annex VI on Liability Arising from 
Environmental Emergencies was adopted by the 28th ATCM in Stockholm in 2005 and will 
enter into force once approved by all Consultative Parties.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON 
AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 422. See Factory at Chorzów (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 47 (Sept. 
13, 1928), available at http://www.icj-cij.org 
/pcij/serie_A/A_17/54_Usine_de_Chorzow_Fond_Arret.pdf (highlighting that reparations 
should attempt to “wipe out all of the consequences of the illegal act”); Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 53 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, art. 
1–2, 30–31, 34–39, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 
26 U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2) (explaining a State’s liability when it 
violates international law); see also id. art. 24–25 (providing the possibility that a state that 
is seriously threatened by climate change may defend a violation of international law based 
upon necessity or even distress). 
 423. See Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm, supra note 392, art. 1, 
cmt. ¶ 2 (“An ultra-hazardous activity is perceived to be an activity with a danger that is 
rarely expected to materialize but might assume, on that rare occasion, grave (more than 
significant, serious or substantial) proportions.”). 
 424. See SANDS & PEEL, supra note 74, at 712 (“Strict liability for ultrahazardous 
activities might be considered a general principle of law . . . .”). 
 425. See id. (explaining that while “[s]trict liability for ultrahazardous activities might 
be considered a general principle of law . . . .” and some treaties include strict liability, the 
current overall landscape of international law does not support strict liability as customary 
law). Nuclear energy, space activities, maritime transportation of oil, and the transportation 
and disposal of hazardous waste share strict or absolute, limited liability. See C. WILFRED 
JENKS, LIABILITY FOR ULTRA-HAZARDOUS ACTIVITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 160–67 (1967) 
(discussing when liability may exist for climate modification). 
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Damage due to Hazardous Activities,426 however, call for States to “ensure 
that prompt and adequate compensation is available for victims” and to 
impose strict liability on the operators of the activity.427 In the case of 
climate engineering and its research, demonstrating causation would be 
particularly daunting.428  
 
VII. Conclusions and Lingering Issues 
 
 Existing international environmental law provides both a regulatory 
and normative framework that will influence climate engineering field 
research and its regulation, and is, on the whole, favorable toward this 
research. Throughout these considerations, the climate change/climate 
engineering tension looms, and how a particular proposed climate 
engineering field experiment would fare under international environmental 
law is to a great degree contingent upon the assessments of the risks of 
climate change, and of both the risks and potential benefits of the field test 
in question. It is important to emphasize that this favorable setting does not 
necessarily extend to the deployment of large-scale climate engineering 
projects. Of course, almost none of this law was developed with climate 
engineering in mind and it consequently forms an inconsistent, sometimes 
contradictory legal environment. Furthermore, drawing general conclusions 
is difficult, as the actual rights and obligations of States will depend on 
numerous factors such as the form of climate engineering being researched, 
its scale, its location, and the likelihood, magnitude, and location of 
potential transboundary effects. Nevertheless, a handful of specific 
conclusions exist. 
 There are five reasons for the generally positive international legal 
environment of climate engineering research. First, to the extent that the 
                                                                                                                           
 426. Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm 
Arising out of Hazardous Activities, 58 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 10, at princ. 4, U.N. Doc. 
A/61/10 (2006), available at legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft 
articles/9_10_2006.pdf.  
 427. See generally id. (establishing strict liability for operators who partake in 
hazardous activities that cause transboundary harm). 
 428. See Toby Svoboda & Peter J. Irvine, Ethical and Technical Challenges in 
Compensating for Harm Due to Solar Radiation Management Geoengineering, 17 ETHICS, 
POL’Y & ENV’T (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 11) (“The uncertainty involved in 
attributing particular changes in climate to specific causes could make it very difficult to 
determine whether some harmful impact, such as a prolonged drought, is due to a deployed 
SRM technique or not.”); but see Joshua B. Horton et al., Liability for Solar 
Geoengineering: Historical Precedents, Contemporary Innovations, and Governance 
Possibilities, 22 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 26) (arguing that 
“the problem of attribution does not necessarily appear to present an insurmountable barrier 
to crafting a workable regime”). 
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MEAs reviewed here seek to protect the environment, they favor, at the 
least, research into climate engineering as a potential means to reduce risks 
to humans and the environment from climate change. International 
environmental law has a generally anthropocentric orientation, and that is 
evident throughout these MEAs. While climate engineering field research 
may present some threat to the natural environment, climate change is 
forecast to pose substantially more significant risks.429 Furthermore, in 
several cases, greenhouse gases and/or climate change appear to satisfy the 
criteria for the pollution, damage, or adverse effects which the MEAs seek 
to reduce.430 Therefore, to the extent that a balancing is suggested by these 
MEAs’ commitments from States to reduce such pollution or damage and 
to protect the environment more generally, they channel and tilt favorably 
toward climate engineering research as a means to develop a potential 
additional response to climate change—even if it presents risks of its 
own.431 At the same time, if a line of climate engineering research were to 
hold little potential to reduce climate change risks while presenting large 
risks of its own, then this balance would shift against the research. 
 Second, many of the agreements explicitly or implicitly encourage 
scientific research and technological development.432 
 Third, the development of climate engineering is also consistent 
with some principles of international environmental law, including common 
but differentiated responsibility, polluter pays, and—in some of its forms—
the precautionary principle, which are invoked at various times by the 
agreements.433 
 Fourth, in several cases, climate engineering research is supported 
due to its projected high speed and low financial cost.434 
                                                                                                                           
 429. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 430. See supra notes 71–75 and accompanying text. 
 431. See supra notes 60‒62 and accompanying text. 
 432. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 118 and accompanying text; UNFCCC, supra 
notes 125–26 and accompanying text; Vienna Convention, supra notes 170, 176 and 
accompanying text; ENMOD, supra notes 146–47 and accompanying text; LRTAP 
Convention, supra note 183 and accompanying text; Oslo Protocol, supra note 198 and 
accompanying text; Outer Space Treaty, supra note 210 and accompanying text; UNCLOS, 
supra notes 241–44 and accompanying text; Antarctica Treaty, supra notes 293, 297–99 and 
accompanying text; OSPAR Convention, supra note 318 and accompanying text; Stockholm 
Declaration, supra note 367 and accompanying text; Rio Declaration, supra note 374 and 
accompanying text. 
 433. See UNFCCC, supra notes 127–32 and accompanying text; Oslo Protocol, supra 
note 187 and accompanying text; OSPAR Convention, supra note 319 and accompanying 
text; Rio Declaration, supra notes 375–76 and accompanying text; see also Reynolds & 
Fleurke, supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
 434. See UNFCCC, supra notes 121–24 and accompanying text; LRTAP Convention, 
supra notes 185–87 and accompanying text. 
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 Fifth and finally, all three agreements whose subject matter are 
most relevant to climate engineering favor climate engineering field 
research.435 The UNFCCC calls for the avoidance of dangerous climate 
change for humanity’s sake,436 for the use of methods that are rapid and 
inexpensive,437 for industrialized countries to shoulder the financial 
burden,438 for precautionary action to mitigate the negative effects of 
climate change,439 for the promotion of applicable scientific and 
technological research,440 and for States to enhance reservoirs and sinks of 
greenhouse gases.441 ENMOD and the UNEP Provisions for Weather 
Modification each encourage the development of peaceful climate 
engineering, in part to improve the environment for the sake of the human 
population.442 
 Despite being supportive of climate engineering research in 
general, existing law imposes duties on the part of the States that would be 
responsible for field research. For the most part, these are the procedural 
duties regarding the prevention and mitigation of transboundary harm, such 
as notification, assessment, consultation, and negotiation.443 These are part 
of customary international law, and the MEAs provide further explicit 
detail for some situations, including that of risks to the environment in areas 
outside of state territory. The Espoo Convention adds public participation in 
the assessment and post-project analysis,444 and the Aarhus Convention 
requires access to information and public participation in decision-making, 
even for projects that would have wholly domestic effects.445 
 Moreover, some of the binding MEAs impose particular constraints 
and prohibitions on parties to these agreements. Among these, the most 
general and most challenging to interpret is the statement of the CBD COP. 
                                                                                                                           
 435. See supra Part IV.A, IV.B, IV.C. 
 436. See supra notes 111–13 and accompanying text. 
 437. See supra notes 121–24 and accompanying text. 
 438. See supra notes 127–29 and accompanying text. 
 439. See supra notes 130–32 and accompanying text. 
 440. See supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text; see also Kyoto Protocol, supra 
note 118 and accompanying text. 
 441. See supra notes 115–18 and accompanying text.  
 442. See ENMOD, supra notes 143–47, and accompanying text; UNEP Provisions for 
Weather Modification, supra notes 356–58 and accompanying text. 
 443. See UNFCCC supra note 133 and accompanying text; CBD, supra note, 159 and 
accompanying text; LRTAP Convention, supra note 205 and accompanying text; Outer 
Space Treaty, supra note 214 and accompanying text; Madrid Protocol, supra notes 307–08 
and accompanying text; OSPAR Convention, supra notes 324–25 and accompanying text; 
Stockholm Declaration, supra note 370 and accompanying text; Rio Declaration, supra note 
384–86 and accompanying text; Weather Modification Provisions, supra notes 358–59 and 
accompanying text. 
 444. See supra note 332–41 and accompanying text. 
 445. See supra notes 343–53 and accompanying text. 
CLIMATE ENGINEERING FIELD RESEARCH 483 
While nonbinding, this statement indicates that the international community 
desires a greater degree of regulation, consideration of risks, and scientific 
justification before large-scale field research is undertaken.446 In contrast, 
the the LC-LP framework for ocean fertilization and the more general 
London Protocal framework for marine geoengineering provide the clearest 
regulation, prohibiting it unless a project is deemed to be legitimate 
scientific research.447 Another strong restriction on climate engineering 
research is the apparent prohibition on sulfur-based SAI SRM field tests 
within the territory of the Parties to the Gothenburg Protocol to the LRTAP 
Convention.448 Throughout the world, climate engineering investigations 
must be non-hostile if they have “widespread, long-lasting or severe 
effects” and if conducted at sea and in Antarctica, they must be for peaceful 
purposes.449 At sea, research must not undermine the protection of marine 
environment, cannot unjustifiably interfere with other legitimate uses of the 
sea, must use appropriate scientific methods and means, and is subject to 
the authority of coastal States in their territory, exclusive economic zones, 
and continental shelves. Furthermore, marine climate engineering work 
cannot merely transfer or transform pollution, although these provisions 
may apply only to climate engineering deployment. In the northeast 
Atlantic Ocean, if there are reasonable grounds that climate engineering 
research may present a hazard to human health or the environment, then the 
state is obligated to take “preventative measures.”450 In the Antarctic Treaty 
area, a permit may be needed in certain locations, and research projects 
must be cancelled if they threaten to harm the environment.451 States would 
be liable for damage caused by climate engineering research in space or if 
they violate international law (although demonstrating causation will be 
difficult).452 In theory, the sulfur-based SAI SRM field tests could be 
prohibited under the Montreal Protocol, if they were found to be 
significantly destructive to the ozone layer and if the Parties actually take 
novel action.453 
                                                                                                                           
 446. See supra notes 159–62 and accompanying text. 
 447. See supra notes 263–89 and accompanying text. 
 448. See supra notes 190–93 and accompanying text; see also Oslo Protocol, supra 
note 206 (noting that large-scale sulfur SAI SRM tests are not permitted under the 
Gothenburg and Oslo Protocol). 
 449. See ENMOD, supra notes 144–45 and accompanying text; UNCLOS, supra note, 
245 and accompanying text; Madrid Protocol, supra note 301 and accompanying text; see 
also Outer Space Treaty, supra note 208, art. III (noting that, in space, activities must merely 
be “in the interest of maintaining international peace and security”). 
 450. See supra notes 319–20 and accompanying text. 
 451. See supra notes 300, 309 and accompanying text. 
 452. See Outer Space Treaty and Space Liability Convention, supra notes 217–21 and 
accompanying text; UNCLOS, supra note 247; customary international law supra Part VI.B. 
 453. See supra notes 163–72 and accompanying text. 
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 Finally, any law governing climate engineering research, whether it 
relies upon existing MEAs or otherwise, will be complicated by a 
determination of what qualifies as climate engineering research. Thus far, 
definitions have been employed that typically rely on the intention of the 
researcher or the effects of the research.454 Intentions, however, are easily 
denied, and the precise effects of field research may remain partially 
unknown until after they are carried out.455 Other important questions arise. 
In terms of scale, at what point does a small-scale project warrant the 
attention of domestic or international law, and at what point does a large-
scale project become deployment?456 How is research that investigates basic 
environmental processes or climate change (or at least claims to do so), yet 
could also be used to develop climate engineering potentially affected? But, 
determining how to define “climate engineering research” and its thresholds 
will likely be the most challenging aspect in the development of its 
regulation.  
 Despite these duties and limited restrictions, extant international 
environmental law remains on the whole favorable to responsibly 
conducted climate engineering field research, particularly due to its 
potential to reduce harm to humans and the environment. Although 
international law does influence state behavior, state interests and global 
and domestic politics arguably play larger roles in shaping the actions of 
decision makers.457 How a potentially controversial, risky, large scale 
climate engineering field test is perceived by the international community 
depends not only on existing international environmental law but also on 
international and domestic political circumstances, the severity of current 
and forecast climate change, the reputations and nationalities of the 
                                                                                                                           
 454. See supra notes 143, 159, 264, 279, 355 and accompanying text. It is important to 
note that the definition of “marine geoengineering” used in the amendment to the London 
Protocol requires only a “deliberate intervention in the marine environment to manipulate 
natural processes.” 
 455. See Kelsi BRACMORT & RICHARD K. LATTANZIO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41371, 
GEOENGINEERING: GOVERNANCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY 1 (2013) (discussing how some 
observers “respond that the uncertainties of geoengineering may only be resolved through 
further scientific and technical examination”). 
 456. See Parson & Keith, supra note 56, at 1278 (suggesting thresholds for defining 
categories of climate engineering research). 
 457. See generally Steinberg, supra note 105 (surveying the neorealist approach to 
international law and international relations); Barbara Koremenos, Institutionalism and 
International Law, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 59 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. 
Pollack, eds., 2013) (surveying the institutionalist approach to international law and 
international relations); see also Victor, supra note 47, at 322 (arguing that treaties “are 
unlikely to be effective in constraining geoengineers because the interests of key players 
diverge and it is relatively easy for countries to avoid inconvenient international 
commitments and act unilaterally”). 
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scientists, the evidence from prior modeling and laboratory experiments, 
the nature of the field experiment, and the robustness of domestic 
regulation. In the worst case scenario, it could become a source of 
significant international tension. 
 Another unfortunate scenario would be the unduly restrictive 
regulation of climate engineering and its research, developed in haste and 
based upon fears and assumptions of potential risks, without balancing such 
risks with climate engineering’s potential to reduce the risks from climate 
change. The result would likely be significant net harm to humans and the 
environment. Considering that we, as an international community, still do 
not know exactly what climate engineering is, what risks its field research 
poses, and what we do and do not want from it, a preferred path would be 
the gradual emergence of norms and rules via a mixture of 
intergovernmental institutions and transnational communities of scientists, 
civil society, and other experts.458 Fortunately, this appears to be 
unfolding.459 Here, many of the bodies established by international 
environmental law will be particularly important. 
                                                                                                                           
 458. See Victor, supra note 47, at 332 (“A more effective approach to building a 
relevant regulatory system would concentrate, today, on laying the groundwork for future 
negotiations over norms rather than attempting to codify immature norms now . . . build[ing] 
norms from the ‘bottom up.’”); see also William Daniel Davis, What Does “Green” Mean?: 
Anthropogenic Climate Change, Geoengineering, and International Environmental Law, 43 
GA. L. REV. 901, 907 (2009) (“An internationally collaborative research program, moreover, 
could begin to develop international behavioral norms that would reduce the risks associated 
with geoengineering.”); David Victor et al., The Geoengineering Option: A Last Resort 
Against Global Warming?, 88 FOREIGN AFF. 64, 66 (2009) (“Governments should 
immediately begin to undertake serious research on geoengineering and help create 
international norms governing its use. . . . Scientists could be influential in creating these 
norms.”); David Keith et al., supra note 53, at 427 (“A better approach would be to build 
international cooperation and norms from the bottom up, as knowledge and experience 
develop.”); Lisa Dilling & Rachel Hauser, Governing Geoengineering Research: Why, When 
and How?, 121 CLIMATIC CHANGE 553, 563 (2013) (“Over time, researchers and 
stakeholders could meet to assess progress in governance, identify emerging norms, and 
correct problems. Governance norms could spread through the sharing of ‘best practices,’ 
and the gradual institutionalization of successful ones.”); M. Granger Morgan et al., Needed: 
Research Guidelines for Solar Radiation Management, 29 ISSUES SCI. & TECH. 37, 41 (2013) 
(“[T]here is a pressing need to develop what we will call a code of best SRM research 
practices.”); Edward Parson & Lisa Ernst, International Governance of Climate 
Engineering, 14 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 307, 324 (2013) (“[E]arly informal cooperation on 
scientific research and risk assessment should seek to develop relevant norms from the 
ground up, by a decentralized process.”); Stefan Schäfer et al., Field Tests of Solar Climate 
Engineering, 3 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 766, 766 (2013) (“As a starting point, [adequate 
governance for climate engineering research] could be achieved through the establishment of 
an international voluntary code of conduct.”). 
 459. See, e.g., MacCracken et al., supra note 129 (recommending governing principles 
for the conduct of climate engineering research); see also BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER’S 
TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE REMEDIATION, supra note 129 (advocating open and 
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interdisciplinary research efforts); Rayner et al., supra note 129 (describing the Oxford 
Principles as “high-level principles for geoengineering governance”). 
